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INTRODUCTION
Ancient' and modern-day adoption statutes balance the interests
of children, birth parents, adoptive parents, states, and countries. In
the United States, adoption statutes were first passed in 1851,2 and
earnesdy revisited and revised following the "BabyJessica" case in the
early 1990s3 to reflect the need to obtain nonidentifying health infor-
mation to be shared with prospective adoptive parents. 4 The guiding
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1 See Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv.
743, 744 (1956) (discussing adoption in ancient Roman, Egyptian,Jewish, and Hindu
law, as well as in the Code of Hammurabi).
2 See Mary L. Saenz Gutierrez, Comment, Oklahoma's New Adoption Code & Disclo-
sure of Identifying Information, 34 TULSA L.J. 133, 139 (1998).
3 DeBoer v. Schmidt (In re Clausen), 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); In
re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992).
4 ALA. CODE § 26-10A-19 (1992 & Supp. 2001); ALAsKA STAT. § 18.50.510 (Michie
2002); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-129 (West 1999); ARt. CODE ANN. § 9-9-505 (Michie
1998); CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8608, 8706, 8801.3, 8817, 8818, 8819, 8909, 9202 (West
1994 & Supp. 2003); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-5-207, 19-5402 (West 1999 & Supp.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
legal principle of the states is that the rights of birth parents are ter-
minated and a subsequent adoption is sanctioned by the state.
5
The federal government, aware of the positive economic impact
of adoption, has enacted legislation granting tax incentives.
6
Over time, other countries have revised their adoption laws in
keeping with international mandates7 and conventions, including
2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-746, 45a-749 (West 1993 & Supp. 2003); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 63.162 (West 1997 & Supp. 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-23 (1999 &
Supp. 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 578-14.5 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2002); IDAHO
CODE § 16-1506(3) (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/22.3
(West 2001); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/18.4, 18.4a (West 1999 & Supp. 2003);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-19-2-7, 31-19-18-1 to 31-19-21-6, 31-19-23-1 to 31-19-24-13 (West
1999); IowA CODE ANN. § 600.8 (West 2001 & Supp. 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-
2122, 59-2130 (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.520 (Banks-Baldwin 1998); LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. art. 214 (West 2003); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 9-304 to 9-310 (West
1998 & Supp. 2002); MD. CODE ANN., FAm. LAW §§ 5-328 to 5-329.1 (1999); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 210, § 5D (Law. Co-op. 1994); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 710.27, 710.68
(West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 259.27, 259.43, 259.47 (West 2003); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 93-17-205 (1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.121 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 42-3-101, 42-3-102, 42-6-102,42-6-105 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-107 (1998); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. 127.152 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-
B:19 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-41.1 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-5-3, 32A-
5-12, 32A-5-14 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 2003); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 373-a (McKinney
2003); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 112, 114, l15a (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2003); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAWv § 2782 (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-3-205, 48-9-103
(2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-16 (1997 & Supp. 2003); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 3107.091, 3107.12, 3107.17, 3107.60, 3107.65, (Anderson 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, §§ 7504-1.1, 7504-1.2 (West 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.342 (2001); 23 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101, 2503, 2504, 2511, 2533, 2905, 2909 (West 2001); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS §§ 25-6-15.2, 25-6-22, 25-6-23 (Michie 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-133
(2001); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 162.005 to 162.008, 162.018 (Vernon 2002); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-30-17 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 2-105 (2002); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 26.33.350, 26.33.380 (West 1997); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-701
(Michie 2001); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.432 (West 2003); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 1-22-116
(Michie 2003).
5 See Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the Constitution: The Case
for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 150, 154 (1999); Claudine R. Reiss,
Comment, The Fear of Opening Pandora's Box: The Need to Restore Birth Parents' Privacy
Rights in the Adoption Process, 28 Sw. U. L. REv. 133, 135-37 (1998).
6 Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 202, 115 Stat. 38, 47 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 23, 137 (2000)).
7 See E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATrERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE HISTORY
OF ADOPTION 3-35 (1998); Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Introduction to Adoption Law and
Practice, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE 1-19 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed., 2000). See
generally BEREND Hovius, FAMILY LAW: CASES, NOTES AND MATERIALS 915-78 (3d ed.
1992) (discussing Canadian adoption law); Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption:
Propriety, Prospects and Pragmatics, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 181 (1996)
(describing the problems with international adoptions and how international law at-
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the need to address the intersection of adoption and child abduc-
tion.8
Adoption law has tried to keep pace with cultural developments
and trends. In the latter part of the past century, the number of Amer-
ican children adopted declined dramatically. Today, the exact num-
ber of adoptions is unknown because the federal government does
not have an established methodology.9
At first blush, religion seems to play a minor role in adoption and
custody disputes. In fact, the role of religion in family law generally
and in adoption law particularly reveals a complex nexus of societal,
familial, and individual interests. As tumultuous as recent adoption
law changes appear, all of them have deep roots10 in historical relig-
ious conceptions of adoption law. By examining classical religious
texts, this Article hopes to inform the reader of the most fundamental
underpinnings of adoption law. Part I discusses Jewish law (also
known as halacha); Part II discusses Canon law; and Part III discusses
Islamic law.1 1
tempts to balance the interests of those countries that demand adoption and those
countries that supply the children to be adopted); Huard, supra note 1, at 746-49
(noting the evolution of American adoption law and demonstrating how it was influ-
enced by the law in England, France, and Spain).
8 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/
LEG/24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999); Hague Conference on Pri-
vate International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session, Including the Protection of
Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, re-
printed in 32 I.L.M. 1134; see Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 514 U.N.T.S. 97, reprinted in 51 Fed.
Reg. 10,493 (Mar. 26, 1986); Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Interna-
tional Parental Child Abduction, at http://travel.state.gov/abduct.html (last visited Nov.
21, 2003).
9 Hollinger, supra note 7, 1-53 to 1-59. Best estimates are between 140,000 and
160,000 adoptions annually. Id. at 1-4.
10 Notwithstanding the provisions of the Multiethnic Placement Act (MEPA) of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-382, §§ 551-555, 108 Stat. 4056, amended by Interethnic Adop-
tions Provisions of 1996 (MEPA-IEP), Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1808, 110 Stat. 1755
(eliminating discrimination on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the
child or the prospective parent), consideration of the birth parent's religious prefer-
ence in placement decisions is still legal and is allowed in Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, and Rhode Island. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-102(b) (Michie 2001), for typical statutory language. In many other
states, taking into account religious preference is the standard, informal practice.
11 It is academically dangerous to attempt to draw firm comparisons based solely
on references to primary sources of religious law. It is not our intention, nor do we
profess the competence to rule on any questions that are left unanswered. The
reader is therefore urged to consult with recognized experts in order to clarify the
legal and theological nuances and implications of this discussion. We have quoted
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I. ADOPTION IN JEWISH LAW (HALAcHA)
Although adoption as a social phenomenon was well known in
Talmudic times and halachic ramifications of that practice have been
frequently addressed in rabbinic literature over a span of centuries,
questions surrounding the issues of adoption have been explored only
in recent times. The Talmud expresses high esteem for individuals
who adopt children. 12 The Gemara declares that one who rears an
orphan in his own home is considered as if he has given birth to that
child. 13 A classic commentator on the Talmud, Rabbi Samuel Edels,
observes that the Talmudic accolade bestowed upon one who rears an
orphan is not limited to the rearing of children bereft of their parents
but also applies to children whose parents are alive but cannot care
for them. 14 In such circumstances as well, the person who rears the
child is considered as if she actually gave birth to the child. However,
technically speaking, references to the "rearing" of a nonbiological
child that occur in halachic writings appear to connote the legal
equivalent of foster care rather than adoption. Indeed, adoption as a
formal legal institution does not exist in Jewish law. Nevertheless, as a
social reality, adoption always existed in Jewish societies and was
acclaimed.
15
Despite the Talmuds ringing endorsement of adoption, the state-
ment recorded in Sanhedrin 19b cannot be understood as establishing
foster care, or even adoption, as the equivalent of parenthood in a
literal sense or even in a narrow legal sense. According to Jewish law,
males are obligated to sire children.1 6 That obligation is discharged
upon the birth of two children, one of each gender. 17 Thus, if he is
extensively from many different sources, some more authoritative than others. This
was done to assist the reader in researching the topic further-the real object of our
endeavor.
12 Talmud Sanhedrin 19b.
13 Id.
14 Maharsha Sanhedrin 19b.
15 For an extensive discussion of resultant halachic liability for child support as
well as the procedures that might engender such liability, see Baruch M. Ezrachi,
Gidrei Hithayevut be-Imutz Yeladim, in 4 No'AM 94 passim (1961). See also ELYAKIM
DEWORKAS, ZIKHRON YEHUDIT: KuNTREs IMUTZ YELADIM BE-AsPAKLARYAT HA-HALAKHAH
22-25 (1991); CHAIM DAVID HALEVI, MAYIM HAYYIM no. 62 (1991); Mordecai Cohen,
Imutz Yeladim lefl ha-Halakhah, in 3 TORAH SHE-BE'AL PEH 73-75 (1961).
16 See JOSEPH KARo, SHULHAN ARUKH, EVEN HA-EZER 1:5 [hereinafter SHULHAN
ARuKH]. The Shulhan Arukh, composed during the middle of the sixteenth century,
serves as the authoritative Code ofJewish Law. The Shulhan Arukh is divided into four
subdivisions, which are further broken down into chapters and laws. Citations to the
Shulhan Arukh are to the work itself, the subdivision, chapter, and law.
17 Id.
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physiologically capable of siring a child, a person who raises or adopts
an orphan, despite the great merit attached to that deed, remains
fully obligated to engage in procreation.'8
A. Historical Background
Although halachic issues regarding the rights of adopted chil-
dren have been discussed throughout the ages, the questions associ-
ated with the issue of open or closed adoption and sealed records
have been dealt with only in the post-medieval period. The earliest
discussion of this topic appears in the work of the seventeenth century
authority, Rabbi Yair Chaim Bacharach, in his collected response. 19
In that work, the discussion of closed adoption is presented in a some-
what tangential and incidental manner.
An anonymous interlocutor presented a question to Rabbi Ba-
charach concerning the apportionment of an estate. 20 The writer de-
scribed a pious gentleman who was also a kohen (priest). This
gentleman had fathered two sons. The older son, preparing for his
nuptials, requested that his father continue to support him after his
marriage. 21 The father, pleading that he did not have the means to
continue to support a married son, refused to do so. 22 Upon being
rebuffed, the son engaged in a vicious physical attack upon his fa-
ther.2 3 As a result of the altercation, the entire family became es-
tranged from the elder son.
Some time later, the father approached the younger son and told
him the following story. He stated that at the time his wife gave birth
to their first child a non-Jewish maid who lived with the family also
gave birth to a baby boy.24 A week after the birth, on the night before
the baby's circumcision, the Jewish mother found a dead baby. She
18 Rabbi Shlomo Kluger, in his glosses to Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 1:1, argues
that, because one who rears an orphan is considered as if he has given birth to that
child, a male may indeed fulfill his obligation to sire children by raising such children
as his own. Id. The view of Rabbi Kluger is a novel, minority opinion. Most authori-
ties maintain that fulfillment of the obligation of procreation requires the siring of
biological children. See DEWORKAS, supra note 15, at 5. Those authorities regard the
Talmudic statement to the effect that rearing a child is tantamount to having given
birth to a child as a figurative expression indicating that, in terms of merit, and for
purposes of divine reward, such deeds are equivalent to raising one's own children.
Id.
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claimed that it was not her child who had died, but the child of the
maid, and that the maid had switched the children. 25 The maid
echoed the mother's version of the events. Nevertheless, the father
insisted that he had never been convinced of the truth of the story
and had always believed that his own son had died and that the child
he had reared was, in reality, the child of the non-Jewish maid. 26 Con-
sequently, he believed that the older son's reprehensible behavior at
the time of his marriage could be attributed to inherited genetic
traits.
The father further related that, at the time of the original inci-
dent, he had asked a "pious rabbi" for guidance regarding the per-
plexing situation. 27 That rabbi counseled him to circumcise the child
and raise him as his own. He was advised that if, in reality, the child
was not his, but was indeed the child of the non-Jewish maid, the cir-
cumcision would serve to effect conversion of the child and the child
would be aJew.28 The father concluded the account by stating that, in
light of the son's subsequent behavior, he was convinced that the
child was not his biological son. 29 Accordingly, he wished his younger
son, whose paternity was not in doubt, to be declared his sole heir.30
The interlocutor solicited Rabbi Bacharach's advice with regard
to the halachic status of the older son and the validity of his claim to a
share of the estate of the deceased.3' Applying accepted principles of
Jewish family law, Rabbi Bacharach responded that paternal-filial com-
portment between the two individuals over a period of time, and the
fact that they held themselves out as father and son and were accepted
as such by the community at large, served to establish presumptive
evidence of the existence of such a relationship. 32 The alleged subse-
quent statement of the father, he asserted, was not sufficient to rebut
that presumption, particularly because it was not based upon an asser-
tion of personal knowledge but merely reflected a conjecture based






30 According to Jewish law, adoptive children do not automatically enjoy rights of
inheritance with regard to the estate of their adoptive parents.
31 BACHARACH, supra note 19, nos. 92-93.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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that the older son was entitled to the privileges and prerogatives of a
biological heir.
3 4
Many years later, Rabbi Moses Sofer, a preeminent authority,
questioned the cogency of the advice of the "pious rabbi" who sug-
gested that the (substituted) child be circumcised and raised as the
husband's own child.35 Rabbi Moses Sofer enumerates several
problems inherent in such a procedure. In the first place, if, in real-
ity, the child is not the child of the father, and people assume that the
child is indeed a biological child, the child will share in his adopted
father's estate. 36 As from the perspective of Jewish law, he is not enti-
tled to do so, the putative father has, in effect, contributed (albeit
unwittingly) to the perpetration of a fraud upon the rightful heirs.
37
Secondly, he notes, if the father were to die and leave no other
living issue, a complication would arise with regard to his wife's eligi-
bility to contract a second marriage. 38 Biblical law stipulates that the
widow of a childless husband must either enter into marriage with a
brother of her deceased husband, an institution known as levirate
marriage (yibbum), or undergo a ceremony of release known as hal-
itzah.39 No such requirement exists if the deceased husband is sur-
vived by a living child. Hence, if the adopted child is erroneously
regarded as a biological child of the deceased husband, the wife
would improperly be permitted to remarry without either levirate
marriage or halitzah. Rabbi Sofer remarks that this issue had already
been noted at an earlier time.40 He refers to a fourteenth century
authority, Rabbenu Jerucham, who remarked upon the propriety of
the institution of adoption in general. 41 Rabbi Sofer cautions that the
adopted child and the community at large may be led to believe that
the adopted child is a biological child and the wife, lacking expertise
in this arcane area of Jewish law, may assume that she is exempt from
levirate marriage and halitzah in the event that her husband dies with-
out a biological descendent.
42
34 Id.
35 2 MOSES SOFER, TESHUVOT HATAM SOFER EVEN HA-EZER no. 125 (n.d.).
36 Hatam Sofer, however, provides technical advice designed to avoid that result. 2
id. For example, Hatam Sofer suggests giving the adopted son his portion of the inher-
itance as an outright gift during his lifetime. 2 id.
37 2 id.
38 2 id.
39 See Deuteronomy 25:5-10.
40 2 SOFER, supra note 35, no. 125.
41 2 id.
42 2 id.
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Thirdly, Hatam Sofer notes that, in the case discussed by Rabbi
Bacharach in Havvot Ya ir, the father was a kohen.43 The sanctity, privi-
leges, and duties that devolve upon a kohen are transferred only to
genealogical descendants; an adopted child does not share in priestly
status.44 Since the "pious rabbi" advised the husband to rear the child
as if the child were his own, it would inevitably follow that the child
would improperly aspire to the privileges, rights, and obligations of
priesthood. In light of these considerations, Hatam Sofer concludes
that the advice of the "pious rabbi" was entirely inappropriate.
45
Although Hatam Sofer does not expressly say so, it is clear from
Rabbi Sofer's comments that if the father had not raised the boy as his
own biological child (closed adoption), but had instead informed him
that he was, in truth, not his son and publicized that fact, the
problems identified by Hatam Sofer would have been totally obviated.
Accordingly, open adoption of the child would have been
unobjectionable.
46
In light of the fact that, in Jewish law, adopted children do not
have the halachic status of biological children, Rabbi Ben-Zion Uziel,
a former Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Israel, has noted that the Hebrew
term for adoption, imutz, is a misnomer.47 Rabbi Uziel points out that
the word imutz connotes the attachment of a branch to a tree. 48 Ap-
plied to adoption, the term signifies that the adopted child has be-




46 Rabbi Meir Steinberg notes that some authorities cite 1 SOFER, supra note 35,
no. 76, as a source for the position that an adopted child enjoys a right to inheritance
in the estate of the adoptive father. MEIR STEINBERG, LIKKUTEI ME'IR 112 (1970). If
that is indeed the correct interpretation of the position expressed by Hatam Sofer, it is
contradicted by Hatam Sofe's comments in 2 SORER, supra note 35, no. 125. Rabbi
Steinberg himself and Rabbi Ben-Zion Uziel maintain that an adopted child does not
inherit from the adoptive father. See 2 BEN-ZION UZIEL, SHA'AREI UZI'EL 1851 (1991);
see also DEWORKAS, supra note 15, at 18-22. Furthermore, as noted by Rabbi
Deworkas, if an adopted child does inherit from his adopted parent, it is not on the
basis of a relationship recognized as a matter of law. Id. at 18-22. Rather, the right of
inheritance is grounded upon a general presumption (umdena) that the father does
indeed wish the child to inherit as a son but, because an adopted child does not
inherit according to halakhah, the adoptive parent wishes him to receive the inheri-
tance as an inter vivos gift effective shortly before the father's death. Id. Thus, the
results that would flow from the operation of laws governing inheritance are avoided.
See also Cohen, supra note 15, at 77-79; Rabbi Moshe Findling, Imutz Yeladim, in 4
No'AM, supra note 15, at 93.
47 2 UZIEL, supra note 46, at 193.
48 2 id. (citing Psalms 80:16).
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case, use of the word imutz is inappropriate. Rather, suggests Rabbi
Uziel, adopted children should be known as benei amunim, literally,
"the children of people who rear them." 49 The point is instructive,
but entirely academic, since Rabbi Uziel, bowing to widespread con-




One of the most prominent halachic decisors of our age, Rabbi
Moses Feinstein, also addressed the issue of open versus closed adop-
tion. In a responsum, Rabbi Feinstein discusses the issue without cit-
ing any of the earlier noted sources.51 Rabbi Feinstein declares that if
the adopted child is of Jewish parentage it is imperative that the iden-
tity of the natural parents not be suppressed.5 2 Rabbi Feinstein notes
that, according to Jewish law, the issue of an adulterous or incestuous
liaison is a mamzer (bastard).53 In order to permit marriage to a per-
son of legitimate birth it is necessary to determine the child's lineage.
More significantly, Rabbi Feinstein contends that even if it is
known that the mother was unmarried and that the child was not born
of an incestuous relationship, and hence is entirely legitimate, it is
nevertheless necessary to determine the identity of the father.54
Based on the comments of the Talmud Yevamot 37b, and on Shulhan
Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 2:11, Rabbi Feinstein asserts that it is necessary for
a child to know the identity of his or her natural parents in order to
ensure that the child will not inadvertently enter into an incestuous
union with a biological sibling.
55
A child who does not know the identity of his or her father may,
quite innocently, marry a paternal half-brother or half-sister. For that
reason, the Talmud declares that it is forbidden for a man to maintain
wives in different cities lest their children grow to maturity without
being aware of the existence of their half-siblings. 56 Ignorant of their
biological relationship, they may enter into an incestuous relation-
ship. Exactly the same concern exists, observes Rabbi Feinstein, in
situations in which a child does not know the identity of his or her
49 2 id. (citing Esther 2:7; Lamentations 4:5).
50 2 id.





56 Talmud Yevamot 37b.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
mother.57 In such instances there is a distinct possibility that the child
may marry a maternal half-brother or half-sister. To be sure, the
chance that such a marriage will actually take place is extremely re-
mote. Yet the Talmud regards conduct that may lead to such an even-
tuality as a violation of a biblical prohibition. 58  Rabbi Feinstein
regards any act having the effect of suppressing parental identity as
constituting a violation of that stricture.59 Accordingly, Rabbi Fein-
stein advocates an adoption in which the child knows the identity of
the biological parents.
60
Nevertheless, despite the halachic cogency of the concern ex-
pressed by Rabbi Feinstein, the adopted child need not have actual
knowledge of the identity of his or her natural parents. As Rabbi Fein-
stein himself observed, the basic requirements of Jewish law may be
fulfilled by having a responsible individual maintain a record of the
identity of the birth parents of the adopted child.61 This would en-
57 1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, no. 162.
58 The verse "lest the land become filled with licentiousness," Leviticus 19:29, is
understood by the Talmud, not as a mere explanation of the preceding injunction,
"Profane not your daughter by delivering her to harlotry," id., but as establishing an
all-encompassing prohibition. Rabbi Samuel Ben Uri, in one of the standard com-
men taries on Shulhan Arukh, appears to consider the fear of marrying one's sibling to
be rabbinic in nature and views citation of this biblical verse to be in the nature of a
mnemonic device (asmakhta). See SAMUEL BEN URI, BET SHMU'EL, SHULHAN ARUKH,
EVEN HA-EZER 13:1 (1698).
59 1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, no. 162.
60 1 id. A contemporary scholar, Dr. Abraham S. Abraham, reports that the late
Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, a foremost Jerusalem rabbinic decisor, similarly
ruled that it is obligatory to inform an adopted child that he or she is adopted and to
disclose the identity of the biological parents in order to assure that the child does
not marry a sibling. 34 ABRAHAM S. ABRAHAM, ZEFANIAH no. 1, at 33 (1994); see also
JUDAH GERSHUNI, KOL TZOFAYiKH 372 (1980) (same).
It is significant to note that such considerations are not at all beyond the realm of
serious practical concern. The prospect of adoptees ignorant of their biological back-
ground marrying a sibling is not so remote. In their well known book, The Adoption
Triangle, Arthur Sorosky, Annette Baran, and Reuben Panner cite a documented real
life instance of a young man who brought his fiancee home to meet his parents, only
to discover that his fiancee was the daughter his mother had surrendered for adop-
tion twenty years previously. ARTHUR D. SOROSKY ET AL., THE ADOPTION TRIANGLE:
THE EFEcrcs OF THE SEALED RECORD ON BIRTH PARENTS, ADoTrIVE PARENTS &
ADoPTEES 124 (3d ed. 1989). These writers describe how the engagement was broken
with much pain and anguish on the part of the couple. Id. A similar incident was
more recently described in the press. See Bob Herbert, A Family Tale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
31, 2001, at All. Sorosky, Baran, and Panner add the general comment that the fear
of falling in love with a biological sibling is an anxiety experienced by many adoptees.
SOROSKV ET AL., supra, at 124. Accordingly, the halachic obligation to inform may
engender a psychological benefit.
61 1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, no. 162.
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able the adopted child to consult the person privy to that information
before entering into a marriage. 62 With such an arrangement in
place, the identity of the biological parents need never be revealed to
the child. In order to satisfy the requirements ofJewish law, it is suffi-
cient for the child to know that there is no barrier to the marriage on
grounds of incest.
63
The late Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, an eminent Talmudist and
religious spokesman, similarly disapproves of withholding facts con-
cerning natural birth from an adopted child. 64 Moreover, he finds no
reason for a desire on the part of Jewish parents to do so. 65 Roman
law, Rabbi Soloveitchik maintains, could conceive only of a physical
relationship and hence was constrained to develop a legal fiction to
encompass cases of adoption. 66 Jewish tradition, on the contrary,
posits a spiritual relationship between teacher and student, and men-
tor and disciple, that is of even greater transcendental significance
than a physical relationship. 67 Adoptive children and adoptive par-
ents stand in a "covenantal" relationship with one another and hence
no legal fiction is either necessary or desirable.
68
The late Rabbi Meir Steinberg, a member of the Rabbinical Court
(Bet Din) of Britain's United Synagogue, authored a monograph enti-
tled Likkutei Meir devoted to a discussion of the laws of adoption.
69
Rabbi Steinberg notes that, at the time of the publication of his book
in 1970, it was the practice of adoption agencies in England to insist
that there be no contact whatsoever between the birth mother and
62 The prohibition is, however, attendant only upon performance of an act that
leads to suppression of knowledge of biological origin. However, once the circum-
stances have been created in which it is impossible to establish paternity, Jewish law
assumes that the prospective matrimonial partner belongs to the great majority of
individuals with whom there exists no consanguineous relationship. 1 id.
63 Rabbi Joseph E. Henkin also stresses the need to inform an adoptee of the
absence of a biological relationship with the adoptive parents. 2 JOSEPH E. HENKIN,
KITVEI HA-GRIYA HENKIN 98 (1989). Rabbi Henkin suggests that an appropriate man-
ner in which the adoptee addresses adoptive parents is "Aunt" and "Uncle" rather
than "Father" and "Mother." 2 id. In this manner, he asserts, one can assure that the
adoptee will not be mistakenly perceived as the biological child of the adoptive par-
ents. 2 id.
64 JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, FAMILY REDEEMED: ESSAYS ON FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
60-61, 109 (David Shatz & Joel B. Wolowelsky eds., 2000).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 60, 109.
67 Id. at 59-61, 109.
68 Id. at 60-61, 109.
69 STEINBERG, supra note 46.
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her child, 70 and that no information concerning either party be con-
veyed to the other.
Rabbi Steinberg reports that it is the policy of the London Bet Din
to ascertain certain information with regard to each adopted child.
71
The Bet Din solicits the following information: (1) whether the natural
mother is Jewish and whether the mother is herself not a mamzeret, (2)
whether the mother is single or married; (3) the identity of the biolog-
ical father; (4) whether the child's status is that of a mamzer, (5)
whether the child is a kohen, Levite, or Israelite; (6) whether the
mother has placed other siblings for adoption (this information is sig-
nificant since, under such circumstances, the possibility of sibling mar-
riage is enhanced); (7) whether the mother is non-Jewish (in such
instances, since Jewish identity is determined by maternal descent, the
child is also non-Jewish and requires conversion); and (8) in the case
of a female child, whether she is permitted to marry a kohen.72
The Bet Din does not endeavor to inform the child of his or her
status as an adoptee. However, Rabbi Steinberg states that the infor-
mation regarding the lineage and status of adopted children is pre-
served by the London Bet Din.73 A special record, known as the Pinkas
Meyuhad, is maintained in which the identity of each child and his or
her halachic status is recorded together with the identity of the biolog-
ical parents, when that information can be determined.7 4 In England,
prior to the marriage of any person celebrated under the aegis of the
United Synagogue (an association of Orthodox synagogues in En-
gland), this record is checked in order to determine if the child is
adopted and, if so, to ascertain that the person is not about to enter
into marriage with a sibling.
75
70 Id. at 19. Later, Rabbi Steinberg reports that, following a change in British law,
it became obligatory to impart to an adopted child the limited information that he or
she was not the biological child of the adoptive parents. Id. at 27.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 20-21.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 The concept of a communal ledger for genealogical purposes is not at all
novel. Rabbi Gedaliah Felder cites Givat Pinhas no. 5, a responsum by the eighteenth
century authority, Rabbi Phinehas Horowitz, who reports that the communal ledgers
were frequently maintained in order to record the status of individuals purported to
have been born of a union that would have prohibited them to marry freely. I
GEDALIAH FELDER, NAHALAT Tzvi 37 (1959) (citing PHINEHAS HOROWITZ, GIVAT PINHAS
no. 5 (n.d.)). Givat Pinhas rules that, where such ledgers are maintained, failure of an
individual's name to be recorded in the communal ledger may be taken as evidence
of legitimate birth. See a/SoJUDAH ASHKENAZI, BE'ER HEITEV, EVEN HA-EZER 2:4 (n.d.).
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This procedure ensures that the adoption remains a closed one
as far as the child is concerned (as was required by local law). The
adopted child is not informed of the identity of his or her parents, but
to ensure that halachic pitfalls are avoided, essential information is
maintained by the Bet Din.7 6 By the same token, maintenance of these
records serves to thwart the goal that adoption legislation was de-
signed to achieve, namely, the establishment of a form of legal fiction
designed to foster the illusion that an adopted child is identical in all
respects to a biological child.7 7 The existence of official communal
records serves to reinforce the concept that, from the point of view of
Jewish law, the relationship established with adopted children does
not at any time become identical to the relationship with biological
children.
Rabbi Steinberg concedes that keeping a child's status as an
adoptee concealed from the child is somewhat problematic. 78 If the
adoptive father of a male child is a kohen or a Levite and the child is
not, the child is bound to become aware of his status when he is not
also called to the reading of the Torah as a kohen or Levite. Moreover,
in the drafting of legal documents, such as a marriage contract or
ketubah, Jewish law requires use of the patronym. 79 Use of the adopt-
ing father's name for that purpose, without clarification, would
render the instrument invalid for reason of misidentification. Rabbi
Steinberg advises that such documents may utilize the name of the
adoptive parent provided that the name is accompanied by the ex-
planatory term "ha-megadlo-who has reared him."80
It is noteworthy that adopted siblings who engage in sexual inter-
course may be deemed guilty of incest.8 1 According to biblical law, it
76 STEINBERG, supra note 46, at 20-21.
77 See Murray Ryburn, Openness in Adoption, 14 ADOPTION & FOSTERING 21 passim
(1990).
78 STEINBERG, supra note 46, at 20-21.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 32. Rabbi Deworkas appears to take note only of Rabbi Steinberg's initial
statements and not of his later comments in which this problem is addressed.
DEWORKAS, supra note 15, at 8. Other contemporary scholars have discussed whether
and how paternity should be acknowledged when the adoptee is called to the Torah,
and in religious documents, such as the marriage contract and bill of divorce. See 1
FELDER, supra note 75, at 122-26; Cohen, supra note 15, at 68-70; Findling, supra note
46, at 74-78.
81 See UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE AcT § 207(a)(2) cmt. (amended 1973), 9A
U.L.A. 183 (1998) (prohibiting marriage between adopted siblings "because of the
social interest in discouraging romantic attachments between such persons even if
there is no genetic risk"). Some states prohibit marriage only between adoptive par-
ents and their adopted children, but not between adopted siblings or with relatives of
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is clear that a marriage between adopted siblings is permissible since
these individuals are not blood relatives. 82 However, there is some
disagreement with regard to whether or not there exists a rabbinic
prohibition forbidding adopted siblings to marry. Some authorities
have argued that since outside observers may be unaware of the fact
that there is no biological relationship, it may appear as if these indi-
viduals are committing an act of incest.83 Accordingly, they raise the
issue of the possibility of a rabbinic prohibition based on marit ayin,
i.e., the perception of wrongdoing in the eyes of a beholder. Interest-
ingly, Rabbi I.J. Weiss, originally a rabbinic judge (dayan) in
Manchester, England, and later Presiding Justice (Av Bet Din) of the
Bet Din of the Eidah ha-Haredit in Jerusalem, reaches the tentative con-
clusion that, in the case of an open adoption in which members of the
community are aware that the individuals are not siblings, a marriage
between adopted children is permitted as there is no reason for peo-
ple to presume that a transgression is taking place. 84 However, Rabbi
Weiss argues that, in instances of closed adoption, the marriage of
adopted siblings should not be countenanced since it may appear to
members of the general public that the marriage is an incestuous
one.
8 5
In a responsum written to Rabbi Steinberg in 1965, Rabbi Weiss
disagrees sharply with one aspect of the procedure adopted by the
London rabbinic court. Rabbi Weiss's responsum appears as an intro-
duction to Rabbi Steinberg's Likkutei Me'ir and was also later pub-
lished in the fourth volume of Rabbi Weiss's own responsa, Minhat
Yitzhak.8 6 Rabbi Weiss emphatically maintains that failure to disclose
the adoptive parents. See Walter J. Watkins, III, The Adopted Child and Intra-Family
Marriage Prohibitions, 49 VA. L. REV. 478, 478-91 (1963). In some states, no relation-
ships involving adopted children are considered incestuous. Id. For a discussion of
the psychological and social grounds for regarding such relationships as incestuous,
see Margaret Mead, Anomalies in American Postdivorce Relationships, in DIVORCE AND AF-
TER 97, 104-08 (Paul Bohannan ed., 1970). For a critique of the decision of a Colo-
rado court declaring restrictions against adopted sibling marriages unconstitutional,
see George I. Katz, Adopted Sibling Marriage in Colorado: Israel v. Allen, 51 U. COLO. L.
REV. 135, 135-51 (1979).
82 Rabbi Steinberg explains that underJewish law adoptive parents are not viewed
as biological parents and, hence, halachic prohibitions with regard to incestuous mar-
riage apply only to biological relatives, not to adoptive ones. STEINBERG, supra note
46, at 19.
83 See STEINBERG, supra note 46, at 19; 4 I.J. WEISS, MINHAT YITZHAK no. 49, § 2
(1967); Findling, supra note 46, at 90.
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to a child the fact of his or her adoption is forbidden.8 7 Rabbi Weiss
cites the previously noted view of Hatam Sofer, which enumerates a
series of halachic problems that may arise if the adopted child is not
informed of the fact of his or her adoption.88
Rabbi Weiss further cites the position of the late Rabbi
Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, who notes that
Jewish law prohibits males and females, other than spouses, mothers
and sons, or fathers and daughters, to hug or kiss one another.89 Sim-
ilarly, there is a prohibition in Jewish law with regard to yihud: mem-
bers of the opposite gender, other than close biological relatives, may
not seclude themselves with one another unless others have access to
the area to which they are confined.90 Rabbi Schneerson declares that
the father-daughter and mother-son exceptions with regard to these
prohibitions apply only to biological children but not to adopted chil-
dren.9 1 Rabbi Schneerson expresses astonishment that many individ-
uals who are meticulous with regard to observance of other
commandments are lax with regard to these prohibitions as they apply
to adopted children. 92 Similarly, Rabbi Menasheh Klein, a contempo-
rary authority and author of the responsa Mishneh Halakhot, lists four-
teen reasons why it is imperative that the adopted child be informed
of the fact of adoption.93 Most compelling of these reasons is the pos-
sibility that an adopted child who is not informed of his or her adop-
tive status will violate prohibitions against intimate physical contact
and seclusion with members of the opposite gender.
94
87 4 id.
88 In a second responsum, Rabbi Weiss asserts that an individual who is an
adoptee is obligated to disclose his or her adoptive status to a prospective marriage
partner before marriage, and that failure to do so may render the marriage nugatory
on .grounds of error (kiddushei ta'ut). See 5 id. no. 44.
89 Menachem Mendel Schneerson, Letter, in 90TZAR HA-POsIM 130, 130 (1969).
90 The parameters of, and exceptions to, this prohibition are discussed in the
Shulhan Arukh. See SHULHAN ARuKH, supra note 16, EVEN HA-EZER 22.
91 Schneerson, supra note 89, at 130.
92 Id.
93 4 MENASHEH KLEIN, MISHNEH HALAOT no. 49 (1970).
94 4 id. Citing the counsel of his father, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef, Rabbi Yitzchak
Yosef explains that from a pragmatic standpoint it is preferable to adopt a girl rather
than a boy because it is the woman who is usually at home on a regular basis.
YITZCHAK YOSEF, SEFER OTZAR DINIM LE-ISHAH U-LE-BAT ch. 37, § 38 (1988). If a male
child is adopted, the mother, who is at home alone with the boy, will more frequently
encounter problems of yihud. Moreover, in referring to oral communications be-
tween two Jerusalem decisors, the late Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and Rabbi
Yosef Shalom Eliashiv, Dr. Abraham prohibits both physical contact and yihud with
adopted children. ABRAHAM, supra note 60, no. 1, at 33. Other contemporary schol-
ars have discussed this issue extensively. See, e.g., Aaron Jacobowitz, Gloss to Even Ha-
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Ezer 22:4, in 9 0ITZAR HA-POSKIM, supra note 89, at 132, 132 (listing an array of scholars
who concur with the opinion of Rabbi Schneerson); see also DEWORKAS, supra note 15,
at 38-39; 2 M. STERNBUCH, TESHUVOT VE-HANHAGOT no. 677 (1994); David Taharani,
Note, in MINHAT SHMU'EL: BA'AYOT HA-ZMAN BE-HALAKHAH 329-31 (S. Khoshkeraman
ed., 1993) (reporting that this is also the opinion of Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef).
However, Rabbi Eliezer Yehudah Waldenberg argues that there are grounds for
leniency in this regard. 6 ELIEZER YEHUDAH WALDENBERG, TzITz ELI'EZER no. 40, § 21
(1961); 7 id. nos. 44-45 (1963). Rabbi Waldenberg limits his permissive ruling to
instances in which the child was adopted before the age of three in the case of a girl
and before the age of nine in the case of a boy. 7 id. His ruling is based upon
considerations found in SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 16, EVEN HA-EZER 22. It should
be noted that Rabbi Feinstein is also somewhat lenient in this regard. See 4 MOSES
FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT MOSHEH, EVEN 1-A-EZER no. 64, § 2 (1985); Moses Feinstein, Be-
Dvar ha-She'elot ha-Merubot be-Inyan Yihud, in 2 NEHORA'I 56 (1985).
Rabbi Waldenberg's leniency is strongly contested by Rabbi Yehoshu'a
Menachem Aaronberg. 3 YEHOSHU'A MENACHEM AARONBERG, SHE'ELOT u-TESHUVOT
DvAR YEHOSHU'A, EVEN HA-EZER nos. 16-17 (1998). As is evident from Rabbi
Waldenberg's response to a communication from Rabbi Iser Yehudah Unterman, 7
WALDENBERG, supra, no. 44, Rabbi Unterman also questions Rabbi Waldenberg's leni-
ency in this matter. See also 2 ISER YEHUDAH UNTERMAN, SHE'ELOT u-TESHUVOT SHEVET
MI-YEHUDAH, EVEN HA-EZER no. 21 (1993). Rabbi Eliezer Brizel also sharply disputes
Rabbi Waldenberg's leniency and notes that Rabbi Yeheskel Sarna concurred with his
view that one may not be permissive in this regard. ELIEZER BRIZEL, SEFER ZIKHRON
AKEIDAT YITZHAK 33-37 (1961). Rabbi Brizel notes that he obtained a letter signed by
Rabbi Dov Berish Weidenfeld, author of Teshuvot Dovev Mesharim, Rabbi Ya'akov Yis-
rael Kanievsky, known as the Steipler, Rabbi Benjamin Mandelkorn, Rabbi of Kom-
memiyut, and Rabbi Ezra Atyeh, Dean of Yeshivat Porat Yosef, in which these
authorities stated that they forbade yihud or any physical contact with adopted chil-
dren. See ZEVI ABRAHAM WEIL, PETAH HA-BAYIT: YIHUD 45 (1987). Furthermore, Rabbi
Samuel ha-Levi Woszner also prohibits yihud with adopted children. 5 SAMUEL HA-
LEVI WOSZNER, SHEVET HA-LEvi no. 205, § 8 (1983). He explained, "I know that the
Rav Tzitz Eli'ezer wrote thus [to be lenient], but he only did so as an apologia [for
those who act in this manner], as he himself notes at the conclusion of his article." 6
id. no. 120 (1986).
It is important to note that Rabbi Feinstein is more permissive with regard to
physical contact than with regard to yihud. 4 FEINSTEIN, supra, no. 64, § 2. He main-
tains that physical contact with adopted children does not have a sexual connotation
(ein zeh derekh ta'avah ve-hibbat bi'ah). 4 id. Although Rabbi Feinstein regards the
problem of yihud with adopted children to be problematic, he also finds grounds for
leniency with regard to that issue. 4 id. However, Rabbi Nahum Yarov, the author of
a highly regarded contemporary compendium on the laws of yihud, Divrei Soferim:
Hilkhot Yihud, disputes Rabbi Feinstein's view and asserts that "[i]t is perfectly obvious
that the prohibitions regarding yihud apply to an adopted boy or girl." 1 NAHUM
YAROV, DIVREi SOFERIM: HILKHOT YIHUD 16-17 (1991).
Rabbi Chaim David Halevi rules leniently with regard to the questions of yihud
and physical contact with adopted children. 3 CHAIM DAVID HALEVI, ASEH LEKHA RAV
no. 39 (n.d.). Although Rabbi Halevi permits yihud with adoptive parents in all cases
of adoption, he maintains that yihud is permitted with adoptive siblings only in cases
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Rabbi Weiss refers to the comments of Nahmanides, who explains
that the Bible prohibits adultery because, if adulterous unions were to
be permitted, paternity would always be in doubt and it would not be
possible to preserve the integrity of the biological family.9 5 A similar
view is expressed by an early-day authority in the Sefer ha-Hinnukh:
9 6
At the root of this precept lies the purpose that the world should be
settled as the Eternal Lord desired; and the Lord blessed is He
wished that everything in His world should produce its fruit (off-
spring), each according to its species, and no one species should
become intermingled with another. And so did He wish that about
a human child it should always be known whose it is, and they
should not become intermingled with one another.
97
Accordingly, Rabbi Weiss underscores the very strong emphasis
placed in Jewish teaching on the integrity of the biological family and
the need to know one's biological roots. Even when it is not possible
for the adopted child to know the identity of his or her biological
parents, Rabbi Weiss maintains that the adoptee must nevertheless be
informed of his or her adoptive status, because society is obligated not
to compromise the integrity of biological families by allowing false
perceptions to arise. 98
Rabbi Feinstein adopts a position contrary to that of these author-
ities in asserting that, in cases in which it is not possible to determine
the identity of the adoptee's biological parents, but it is known that
they are of the Jewish faith, one is not obligated to inform the adoptee
of the fact that he or she is adopted.99
C. Adoption of a Non-Jewish Child
Non-Jewish youngsters who are adopted by Jewish parents retain
their status as non-Jews unless they undergo conversion to Judaism.
As discussed by the Talmud and accompanying commentaries, minor
children may be converted if they are presented to the Bet Din by the
of closed adoption in which the children believe themselves to be biologically related.
3 id.
95 RAMBAN (NACHMANIDES): COMMENTARY ON THE TORAH-LEVITICUS 18:20, at
257-58 (Charles B. Chavel trans., 1974).
96 Authorship of this work is usually attributed to Rabbi Aharon ha-Levi, although
some scholars debate whether this attribution is correct. For an extensive discussion
of this debate, see David Metzger, Sefer ha-Hinnukh u-Mehabro, in I JOSEPH BABAD,
MINHAT HINNUKH 15-19 (1988).
97 AHARON HA-LEvI, SEFER HA-HINNUKHmitzvah 35 (n.d.).
98 4 WEISS, supra note 83, no. 49.
99 1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, no. 162.
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biological parents for that purpose.100 Alternatively, when the biologi-
cal parents are deceased or they have abandoned the child, the Bet
Din may carry out the conversion on its own initiative. 10 1 In each of
those circumstances, the child retains the right to renounce the con-
version upon reaching the age of legal majority (twelve years of age
for a girl and thirteen years of age for a boy). Upon renunciation of
the conversion, the child returns to his or her original status as a non-
Jew. However, if the child does not renounce the conversion immedi-
ately upon reaching the age of legal capacity, the conversion is re-
garded as having been confirmed and cannot subsequently be
rescinded. Failure to renounce the conversion in a timely manner is
considered to be tantamount to acceptance of the conversion.102 Ac-
cordingly, the religious status of a minor child cannot be fully clarified
until the child reaches the age of legal majority.
Rabbi Moses Feinstein takes note of the fact that the right to re-
nounce the conversion is lost if it is not exercised immediately only
because failure to renounce the conversion constitutes tacit accept-
ance of its effect. 10 3 Accordingly, argues Rabbi Feinstein, acceptance
can be imputed only if the child is aware of the fact that a conversion
has taken place; failure to renounce a conversion of which one is in
ignorance can hardly be construed as acceptance. 10 4 Therefore, ar-
gues Rabbi Feinstein, in instances of closed adoption, the child who
was adopted and converted as a minor retains the right to protest and
renounce the conversion upon becoming aware of the fact, even if
those events take place at a much later age. 10 5 As a result, the relig-
ious status of such an individual might remain in a state of doubt for a
considerable period of time. Hence, since such an individual, when
informed of his or her status as a convert, may decide to renounce
Judaism, that person may not be permitted to enter into a marital
relationship until informed of his or her adoptive status, lest he or she
renounce the conversion at a later time and the marriage retroactively
become a union between a non-Jew and a Jew. Consequently, Rabbi
Feinstein forcefully asserts that not only is it imperative that non-Jew-
ish children be informed that they are adopted and have undergone
conversion, but also that this information be shared with them before
100 Talmud Ketubot Ila.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, nos. 161-62.
104 1 id.
105 1 id. Although not noted by Rabbi Feinstein, this position was also enunciated
at a much earlier time by the sixteenth century authority, Rabbi Solomon Luria. So.
OMON LURIA, YAM SHEL SHLOMOH, KETUBOT 1:35 (n.d.).
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they reach the age of legal majority.'0 6 In that manner, their religious
status can be determined with finality upon reaching the age of legal
capacity. 1
07
A further problem arises in the adoption of non-Jewish females by
virtue of the halachic regulation prohibiting a female convert from
marrying a kohen.10 8 Accordingly, Rabbi Feinstein regards that factor
as constituting yet another reason for mandating that a non-Jewish girl
who is adopted and converted to Judaism be informed of her status,
since only in that manner can she be prevented from subsequently
entering into a marriage with a kohen.109
II. ADOPTION IN THE TRADITION OF CATHOLIC CANON LAW
Canon law is a discipline that must be understood historically, as
part of an unfolding and ongoing tradition. Each of the four sections
in this Part addresses a different epoch in Church history. The epoch
in Part II.A, dealing with developments in the first five centuries of
ecclesiastical history, witnessed St. Paul's appropriation of the Greco-
Roman legal concept of adoption to describe the relationship of the
106 1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, nos. 161-62.
107 Rabbi Feinstein's position has been endorsed by Rabbi Weiss and Rabbi Klein.
4 KLEIN, supra note 93, no. 167; 3 WEISS, supra note 83, no. 99, § 13 (1962). However,
Rabbi Azariah Berzon, a contemporary scholar, argues that minor children who are
adopted cannot renounce a conversion initiated by adopted parents on their behalf.
Azariah Berzon, Be-Inyan Ger Katan, in 4 BARAui 197-208 (1987); see also 2 MOSHE
STERNBUCH, TESHUVOT VE-HANHAGOT no. 678 (1988) (adopting a similar position).
Rabbi Berzon's argument is based on an interpretation of Maimonides (author of the
Mishneh Torah, a classic formal code ofJewish law) that he cites as having heard from
Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik in the name of the latter's grandfather, Rabbi Chaim
Soloveitchik. According to this line of interpretation, Maimonides is understood as
asserting that a minor child is to be considered as having the status of a "captive" and
may be forced to convert without his or her approval. See MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH To-
RAIH, HILKHOT AVADIM 8:20 (n.d.). Although Rabbi Soloveitchik suggests this line of
reasoning in elucidating the position of Maimonides, it is not at all evident that other
authorities would agree. See Berzon, supra, at 197-208. Rabbi Berzon contends that
Maimonides's view is not disputed by any other authority, id., however, that conten-
tion is, at best, an argumentum ad silencium and certainly cannot be invoked in support
of a novel thesis not formulated in any other source.
108 See SHULHAN ARuKH, supra note 16, EVEN HA-EZER 6:8.
109 1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, no. 162. It should be added that, not only is a
convert prohibited from marrying a kohen, but ajewish girl who is the child of a non-
Jewish father is also prohibited from marrying a kohen. See SHULHAN ARUKH, supra
note 16, EVEN HA-EZER 4:19. Accordingly, Rabbi Feinstein notes that if the adopted
child is the biological child of a non-Jewish father, the child must be informed of that
fact. 1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 51, no. 162. For a further discussion concerning the
status of such an individual with regard to ramifications pertaining to marriage to a
kohen, see 1 FEINSTEIN, supra note 94, no. 5.
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
believing Christian to Christ. This early period also saw the flourish-
ing of a Roman system of adoption, whose legal forms would shape
the canonistic understanding of this legal institution for centuries to
come.
Part II.B, then, addresses developments in the early Middle Ages,
roughly the period from 500 to 1050 A.D. In Western Europe, this
was a period of social breakdown and chaos, as various Germanic king-
doms which supplanted Roman authority in the West rose and fell
with disturbing regularity. The Church proposed various informal
and formal means of taking in children as means of alleviating some
of the suffering of this socially disorganized era.
Part II.C starts with the end of the eleventh century. By this time,
a new political order was beginning to emerge on the European conti-
nent, one that guaranteed at least a modicum of stability. It was in
this context, during the twelfth through fifteenth centuries, that
Church lawyers turned to Roman law sources to build a basic law of
adoption.
Finally, Part II.D addresses developments of the last five hundred
years. These centuries featured the European discovery of the new
world and the growth of an American Church, the gradual emergence
of new secular political entities on the European continent, and the
development of new motives to adopt.
A. Adoption in the Earliest Period of Church History
(First to Fifth Centuries)
The concept of adoption is as old as Catholicism itself. It is trace-
able to the writings of St. Paul, who taught that all who are led by the
Spirit of God are sons of God. 1 10 This relationship was created by
adoption and allows God's children, the followers of Christ, to call
upon God with the epithet "Abba, Father.""' It is through adoption
that the followers of Christ, like God's chosen people, the Jews, have
been made heirs of God's kingdom and recipients of His grace and
love. 112
Paul employed a Greek legal term-huiothesia-to describe this
relationship. 113 In so doing, Paul imparted to the legal category a new
meaning: while in the Greco-Roman world, adoption was seen as serv-
110 Romans 8:14-15.
111 Id. at 8:15.
112 See id. at 9:1-13.
113 For St. Paul's use of huiothesia, consult the Greek New Testament at the follow-
ing verses: Romans 8:14-15; Romans 8:23; Romans 9:14; Galatians 4:4-5; and Ephesians
1:4-5. See THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT (Kurt Aland et al. eds., 3d. ed. 1966).
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ing the needs of the adoptive parents, 1 4 in the Christian conception,
it would be seen above all as an act of love by the one adopting. As
one commentator put it, adoption became "the supreme expression
of God's love and grace."'1 5 Although it would take centuries for the
full implications of this teaching to be realized, this manner of speak-
ing and thinking about adoption was present from the foundation of
the Christian tradition.
The Roman law of the classical period, whose legal forms canon-
ists would borrow in the course of the great juristic revival which oc-
curred in the twelfth century, had a well developed body of adoption
law. This law was intended primarily to meet the dynastic needs of
aristocratic Romans, not to meet pressing social needs such as child
abandonment. Indeed, child abandonment, a practice known gener-
ally as "exposure," was a regular and depressing feature of Roman life
during the first, second, and third centuries. 116
The Christian emperors of the fourth and fifth centuries sought
with only limited success to outlaw the practice of exposure. Emperor
Constantine inveighed against the "right of life and the power of
death" fathers once held over their children, with the implication that
such ultimate power no longer belonged to heads of household.
1 17
Even Constantine conceded that such children might be exploited as
slaves, 118 although the Emperor Justinian in the sixth century decreed
that children taken in by new parents were to enjoy free status, even if
their original status had been servile. 119
The actual structure the Roman lawyers built during the classical
and post-classical periods to accommodate adoption distinguished be-
tween two types of adoption. Gaius's Institutes, which were written in
the mid-second century, described the first form of adoption, adroga-
tio, as involving the adoption by a paterfamilias (head of household) of
someone who was already sui iuris, a "master of his own affairs," who
114 For information on adoption in the ancient Greek world, see LENE RUBINSTEIN,
ADOPTION IN IV CENTURY ATHENS 62-76 (1993); and JAMES M. SCOTr, ADOPTION AS
SONS OF GOD 3-5 (1992).
115 James I. Cook, The Concept of Adoption in the Theology of Paul, in SAVED BY HOPE
133, 139 (James I. Cook ed., 1978).
116 See, e.g., W.V. Harris, Child Exposure in the Roman Empire, 84 J. ROMAN STUD. 1,
1-9 (1994) (documenting exploitation of abandoned children as slaves); Beryl Raw-
son, Adult-Child Relationships in Roman Society, in MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND CHILDREN IN
ANCIENT ROME 7, 8-11 (Beryl Rawson ed., 1991) (detailing various motives for Roman
women to abandon, abort, or kill their newborn or unborn children).
117 CODEJUST. 8.46.10.
118 CODE THEOD. 5.9.1.
119 CODEJUST. 1.4.24.
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had been emancipated by his biological father. 120 It was called adroga-
tio, Gaius noted, because the one who adopts must be asked whether
he wishes the one who is to be adopted as his son, while the one who
is being adopted is similarly asked whether he approves of the adop-
tion. 121 This form of adoption required the "authority of the people,"
meaning approval by the imperial authority itself.122 Presumably, it
could occur only within the presence of the emperor and only in
Rome. 12
3
The second form of adoption, which came to be known as "sim-
ple adoption," did not involve these formalities. This form of adop-
tion might take place in the provinces before the provincial governor
or some other imperial official. Daughters could not be adopted by
adrogatio, but might be adopted by simple adoption. 124 Children of
any age might be adopted by simple adoption, and while adrogatio was
typically reserved to sons above the age of puberty, this rule could be
relaxed for sufficient reasons. 125
This basic outline came to shape the way in which later Roman
law would treat adoption. The Institutes of Justinian modified Gaius's
Institutes in some particulars, but retained these essential elements.
Adoption, Justinian wrote, was of two types: by rescript issued by the
emperor, or by inferior provincial magistrates; the former was known
as adrogatio, and the latter was known simply as adoption. 126 Some
aspects of Gaius's rules were modified: daughters as well as sons, Jus-
tinian taught, might be adopted by adrogatio.127 But in the main, the
old rules were kept. It is this conception of adoption that would shape
future canonistic treatment of the subject, particularly beginning in
the twelfth century.
B. Adoption in the Early Middle Ages (500-1050 A.D.)
The collapse of Roman political authority in the Western empire,
traditionally ascribed to the year 476, was followed by the emergence
of various small Germanic principalities and kingdoms scattered
throughout what is now Western Europe. These groups brought with
them many customary practices, although with the passage of years,
they amalgamated their practices with the newer Christian ideas and
120 G. INST. 1.97-1.99 (F. De Zulueta trans.).
121 Id. at 1.99.
122 Id. at 1.99-1.100.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1.101.
125 Id. at 1.102.
126 J. INST. 1.11.1.
127 Id.
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ideals that survived in the early medieval West, largely through the
medium of the Latin clergy and monks. One occasionally saw the rise
of mighty empires, such as Charlemagne's Frankish kingdom in the
eighth century and Ottonian Germany in the years before 1000, but
these were temporary affairs unable to survive the turmoil of the age.
It is against this backdrop that the Church's law and practice of
adoption needs to be understood. Law at this time was rudimentary.
The Church, however, did not vary in its commitment to protect soci-
ety's most vulnerable members, although the means at its disposal
were modest. Throughout these centuries, the Church continually
struggled against the evil of child abandonment and viewed adoption
and other less formal means of taking children in as an alternative to
near certain death.
Infanticide was a crime that was regularly condemned in the can-
onistic sources. As early as 490, one finds the Council of Vaisons de-
claring those who exposed children to be guilty of homicide.1 28
Infanticide was even a problem for the institutional Church. A letter
of St. Boniface, the great eighth century Anglo-Saxon missionary to
the Germans and the English, reported that he was horrified upon
visiting one English monastery for women.1 29 The women he encoun-
tered were more "prostitutes than nuns," who willingly killed their
newborn children, choosing "not to fill the churches of Christ with
adopted sons, but instead filling the graveyards with the corpses of
infants and the netherworld with their pathetic souls." 130
Church law, however, stood firmly against the practice of expo-
sure and other forms of infanticide. The early medieval penitential
literature, which developed to "provide[ ] guidance for confessors in
dealing with sinners who wished to be reconciled with God and to
make their peace with the Church," contained numerous provisions
128 Concilium Vasense Primum, in 84 PATROLOGIA LATINA 259, 262 (J.-P. Migne ed.,
Paris, Montrouge 1850).
129 Letter of Boniface and Five German Bishops to Ethelbald, King of Mercia, Urging Him
to Reform, in 3 COUNCILS AND ECCLESIASTICAL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO GREAT BRITAIN
AND IRELAND 354, 354 (Arthur West Haddan & William Stubbs eds., Oxford, Claren-
don Press 1871) [hereinafter Letter of Boniface]; see alsoJOHN BOSWELL, THE KINDNESS
OF STRANGERS 210-11 (1988) (analyzing and translating the text of the letter).
130 Letter of Boniface, supra note 129, at 354 (" [N] on inplentes Christi ecclesias filiis
adoptivis, sed tumulos corporibus et inferos miseris animabus satiantes."); see also Bos-
WELL, supra note 129, at 210-11 (interpreting the source to read "[flor when these
harlots, whether in the world or in convents, bear in sinfulness their ill-conceived
offspring, they also for the most part kill them, not filling the churches of Christ with
adopted children, but rather filling tombs with their bodies and hell with their pitiful
souls").
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on infanticide. 131 This body of literature, which had its origins in Ire-
land but which quickly spread throughout Western Europe, imposed
harsh punishments on infanticide. Thus, a woman who killed her
son, the Canons of Gregory taught, was subject to fifteen years' penance;
however, the next canon qualified this assertion: where the killing was
done by a "poor little girl" (paupercula), she should be liable to seven
years' penance.132 These provisions would be repeated in the Peniten-
tiale of Theodore. 1
33
Early medieval canonical collections echoed these rules. Thus,
one finds in the early tenth century collection of Regino of Prum a
text declaring that a woman who willfully (voluntarie) killed her son or
daughter should be accounted a homicide and serve a ten year pen-
ance. 134 A second text asserted that women who conceive in fornica-
tion and try to conceal this fact through infanticide should in justice
be deprived of communion until the end of their days, but in mercy
may be returned to the table after ten years.
135
The institutional Church not only condemned infanticide but ac-
tively sought to protect children's lives. An informal system of adop-
tion developed to facilitate the transfer of children from birth parents
who could not provide for their upbringing to parents who could pro-
vide at least a modicum of support. The same Council of Vaisons
which legislated against exposure also laid down rules by which a par-
ent might expose a child with some hope of that child being found
and raised.136 Noting in a preamble that children, who should be the
objects of human mercy, must not be left in the elements to be torn
apart by dogs, the Council enacted the following rules: (1) finders of
such children are encouraged to take them in and raise them; (2)
finders should furthermore notify their pastor of their discoveries; (3)
pastors are to announce such discoveries at Sunday Mass; (4) should
the children then be claimed by those responsible for the abandon-
ment, compensation should be made to the finders; and (5) if no one
131 JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 152
(1987).
132 Canones Gregorii, in DIE BUSSORDNUNGEN DER ABENDLANDISCHEN KIRCHE 172
(F.W.H. Wasserschleben ed., 1958).
133 Poenitentiale Theodori, in DIE BUSSORDNUNGEN DER ABENDLANDISCHEN KIRCHE,
supra note 132, at 200.
134 Libri Duo De Synodalibus Causis bk. 2, in 132. PATROLOGIA LATINA, Supra note
128, at 298 (1853).
135 Id.
136 Concilium Vasense Primum, supra note 128, at 261-62; see also BOSWELL, sUpra
note 129, at 201-02 (reviewing this text).
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came forward to make such a claim, the finders were presumably free
to raise the children as their own.
137
This sort of informal adoption persisted throughout the early
Middle Ages. Thus, one finds a similar set of rules repeated in the
course of the hagiographic Life of St. Goar.138 At Trier, the Life
records, a young woman who did not want to raise her child, either
because she did want the parentage to become known or because she
lacked resources for the proper nurturance and care of the child,
might leave the infant in a specially designated marble sink at the ca-
thedral. 139 Should someone see the child, he or she was free to take
the child home and raise it as his or her own. Otherwise, Church
officials would make an effort to place the child with willing parents
from within the congregation. 140
The historical record makes clear that adoptions of a more for-
mal nature also occurred throughout the early Middle Ages. Gregory
of Tours recorded that in 577, King Guntramnus of the Franks, who
was childless, assembled the realm's notables so that he might obtain
their advice and consent. 141 He had sinned, he announced to the
gathered nobility, and so God had punished him by leaving him with-
out issue. He now wished to remedy the situation by seeking the as-
sembly's approval "that my nephew be made my son," and his request
was honored.142 Childebert, Guntramnus's nephew, was made heir to
the kingdom, succeeded his adoptive father on the throne, 143 and
subsequently repeated the process by adopting his nephew as his
son.
1 44
137 Concilium Vasense Primum, supra note 128, at 261-62; see also BOSWELL, supra
note 129, at 172-73 (noting that the purpose of this legislation was to "encourag[e]
people to pick up and rear abandoned children without fear of unpleasant conse-
quences or of losing the child in whom they invest time and money").
138 De Vita et Miraculis Sancti Goaris, in 121 PATROLOGIA LATINA, supra note 128, at
649 (1852); see also BOSWELL, supra note 129, at 217-19 (analyzing and translating this
text).
139 De Vita et Miraculis Sancti Goaris, supra note 138, at 649; see also BOSWELL, supra
note 129, at 217-18 (analyzing and translating this text).
140 De Vita et Miraculis Sancti Goaris, supra note 138, at 649; see also BOSWELL, supra
note 129, at 218 (analyzing and translating this text).
141 GREGORY OF TOURS, HIsTORIA FRANCORUM, in 1 MONUMENTA GERMANIAE HIS-
TORICA bk. 5, pt. 17, at 208 (W. Arndt & Br. Krusch eds., Hannover, Hahn 1885).
142 Id..("[U]t hic nepus meus mihi sit filius .... ").
143 DANItLE ALEXANDRE-BIDON & DIDIER LETT, CHILDREN IN THE MIDDLE AGES 19
(Jody Gladding trans., 1999).
144 GREGORY OF TouRs, supra note 141, bk. 9, pt. 20, at 379.
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C. The Later Middle Ages: Scholasticism and Canon Law
(1050-1500 A.D.)
A legal revolution swept Western Europe beginning in the latter
years of the eleventh century and gathering force in the twelfth.
1 45
After centuries of neglect, this revolution saw the revival of interest in
the Roman law books of Justinian and the systematization of the Ca-
non law. 14 6 The system of Canon law that emerged as a result of this
process borrowed Roman concepts and ideas where it seemed fit to do
so, but also retained its own independence. 14 7 Canon law also ac-
quired a vigorous new life as an instrument by which Church leaders
proposed to reform European life. 148 A system of courts was put into
place, supervised generally by local bishops and papal judges-delegate,
ambassadors in a sense, who were answerable to the Pope.1 49 This is
the necessary context when we consider the changes that occurred in
the Canon law of adoption in the course of these later centuries.
At the level of speculative theology, new life was given to the con-
cept of adoption by writers like Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas.
The twelfth century writer, Peter Lombard, whose Sentences formed
the obligatory starting point for scholastic writing for the rest of the
Middle Ages, began his inquiry into adoption by asking whether Jesus
Christ was God's adopted son. 150 No, Lombard responded, Jesus must
be considered God's natural son because He shares God's very nature
and divinity. 15 1 Thanks to God's boundless grace, we mortals, the
"sons of wrath" (iraefilii), have been adopted as God's sons, but only
Jesus participates in God's divinity by His very nature.'
52
Thomas Aquinas developed these ideas further. Commenting on
Lombard's text, Aquinas emphasized the importance of divine love to
the idea of adoption and in the process connected the ideas of love
and adoption in a way in which they had not previously been attached.
145 See generally HAROLDJ. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION (1983) (arguing that the
Western legal tradition began in the eleventh century with the systemization of Canon
law).
146 R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 17-20 (1996).
147 Id.
148 JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 70 (1995). James Brundage has
observed, concerning the canonists of this era: "They believed that they had not
merely the right but the duty to repress any religious or moral ideas that departed
from orthodox norms." Id.
149 Id. at 120-28.
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"Adoption," Aquinas wrote, "depends upon the kindness of the one
adopting and the one adopted. God is especially kind and the great-
est lover of humankind. Therefore God is uniquely competent to
adopt."
15 3
The canonists, in giving effect to the notion of adoption, bor-
rowed from the Roman lawyers of the classical and post-classical era.
Rufinus, a particularly precocious canonist of the latter twelfth cen-
tury, distinguished between three types of relationships a parent
might have with children: one might be the natural parent of natural
offspring; one might have a "spiritual" relationship with someone
else's children through sponsorship at baptism; or one might have
adopted children, "who are not one's own by natural childbirth, but
are made into one's own children so as to be installed as heirs."'
154
By the thirteenth century, one discovers canonists who have bor-
rowed many of the details of the Roman law of adoption. Adoption,
the canonist Tancred asserted, was "the legitimate assumption of a
'foreign person' [extranaeae personae] as one's own son or grand-
son." 155 There are two types of adoption, Tancred continued, "arro-
gation" and "simple adoption."'1 6 Arrogation occurred when one
who has no father, or who is not under paternal power, is transferred
to the paternal power of the adoptive father.1 57 Simple adoption, on
the other hand, occurred when an adoptive father adopts one who is
under someone else's paternal power.'
58
Having borrowed from Roman law for these general features,
Tancred set out a series of more specific rules governing the process
of adoption. An adoptive father must himself be the head of a house-
hold and capable of procreation. 159 In other words, he must not be a
eunuch or impotent.160 An adoptive father must not be over the age
of seventy; an adoptive child must still be in his or her minority.'
6 '
Following Roman law, Tancred declared that women ordinarily may
153 Luc-THOMAS SOMME, FILS ADOPTIFS DE DIEU PAR JESUS CHRIST: LA FILIATION
DIVINE 16 (1997) ("Adoptio contingit ex benignitate adoptantis et adoptatum. Sed
Deus maxime benignus et amator est hominum. Ergo ipsi maxime competit
adoptare.").
154 RUFINUS, SuMMA DECRETORUM 462 (Heinrich Singer ed., 1963).
155 TANCRED, SUMMA DE MATRIMONIO 39 (Agathon Wunderlich ed., G6ttingen,






161 Id. at 39-40.
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not adopt, but they could be given permission to do so by the
emperor. 
1 62
Tancred also laid down rules concerning who might be adopted.
Anyone, either male or female, may be adopted so long as he or she
does not exceed the age limits. 16 3 The effect, at least of adoption by
arrogation, meant that one would be considered in all respects a son
or daughter of the one adopting and would receive a child's portion
of the inheritance, should the father die intestate. 164
The rules that Rufinus, Tancred, and other early canonists laid
down would help give definitive shape to the Canon law of adoption.
But in addition to the rules governing formal adoption, the canonists
still retained the possibility of informal adoption, so widely endorsed
in the early Middle Ages.
Gratian's Decretum, the mid-twelfth century systematization of Ca-
non law that scholars view as the starting point of the classical age of
Canon law, retained the practice of informal adoption that it had in-
herited from early medieval sources.165 Gratian included in the mas-
sive collection he assembled an excerpt from the Fourth Council of
Toledo, which provided that a child abandoned in front of a church
might, "out of mercy," be picked up by anyone.' 66 A relative had ten
days to contest the informal adoption, after which time the new par-
ent might rest secure.1 67
While one should always be aware of the distinction between the
sources Gratian collected and his analysis of these sources, it seems
that Gratian's inclusion of this text in the Decretum was without contro-
versy. Indeed, it became a focal point for subsequent commentary
about the rights of parents to retrieve and raise children in desperate
need.'16  By the time one reaches the early twelfth century, the ten
day waiting period had largely disappeared, replaced by a presump-
tion that such cruel treatment merited an immediate termination of
parental rights. Johannes Teutonicus, for instance, who authored the
ordinary or received gloss on Gratian's Decretum, asserted that the ten
162 Id. (following CODE JUST. 8.47.5 closely).
163 Id. at 40.
164 Id.
165 See, e.g., BRUNDAGE, supra note 148, at 47-49 (discussing the importance of
Gratian's work); John T. Noonan, Jr., Gratian Slept Here: The Changing Identity of the
Father of the Systematic Study of Canon Law, 35 TRADITIO 145 (1979) (examining what we
know about Gratian, the person and the lawyer).
166 See D.87 c.9.
167 Id.
168 See CHARLES J. REID, JR., POWER OVER THE BoDy, EQUALITY IN THE FAMILY:
RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN MEDIEVAL CANON LAW (forthcoming 2004) (man-
uscript at 455-59, on file with author).
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day time period applied only where the exposure was effectuated by
some underling and the parents of the child were themselves unaware
of it.169
The Liber Extra, the great compilation of papal law promulgated
in 1234 by Pope Gregory IX, contained similar legislation. If a father,
Pope Gregory wrote, has taken leave of all parental responsibility by
abandoning a child, either personally or through agents, that child
was thereby freed of paternal power. 170 There was no possibility of
the father reclaiming the child.171 Furthermore, a child born into ser-
vile status was freed of that status upon abandonment.1 72 No one who
subsequently claimed the child had any claim on that child's enforced
labor. 173 Gregory concluded that the same rule regarding the termi-
nation of paternal rights applied where a child has been "impiously"
denied nourishment, thereby threatening his or her health. 174
It has been contended byjack Goody that the Middle Ages largely
lacked the practice of adoption because of the Canon law's perceived
opposition to leaving inheritances to children instead of the
Church. 175 In fact, adoption remained deeply embedded in the law
and reality of medieval Christendom.
D. The Modern Canon Law of Adoption
A treatment of the modern Canon law of adoption needs to take
account of three different streams of development. The first concerns
the operation of Canon law in this field of family life in the changed
circumstances of early-modern and modern Europe, in which secular,
not Church, courts had taken the lead in the administration of domes-
tic relations law. The second concerns the emergence of a distinc-
tively American Catholic system of adoption, which resulted from the
Church's resistance, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
to Protestant efforts to use the adoption laws as a means of removing
children from "unfit" Catholic parents and placing them with evangel-
ical families. The third stream, which has become especially strong in
169 See JOHANNES TEUTONICUS, GLOSSA ORDINARIA, D.87 c.9, v. expositus. On






175 JACK GOODY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE IN EUROPE
99-102 (1983). Goody's views have now been effectively refuted by James Brundage.
SeeJames A. Brundage, Adoption in the Medieval lus Commune, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
TENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 889, 891-93, 897 (2001).
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the last thirty years, flows from the Church's commitment to protect-
ing innocent human life, especially against the evil of abortion.
Canonists of the early-modern and modern period by and large
retained the Roman law framework that developed in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. Tomds Sanchez, whose work on marriage law,
De Sancto Matrimonio (On Holy Matrimony) ,176 remains one of the lead-
ing canonistic treatises on the subject, retained the same vocabulary
and set of ideas one found in Roman law on the subject and from
Canon lawyers such as Tancred. Thus, Sanchez asserted that there
were two types of adoption- arrogatio and simplex adoptio ("simple
adoption") .177
Arrogatio, Sdnchez declared, was "perfect adoption," in which the
one adopted was placed under his or her new father's paternal power
and made his necessary heir. 178 In contrast, simple adoption did not
result in a child being transferred from the authority of one's natural
parents to the adoptive parents. 179 Rather, the child remained subject
to his or her natural father's paternal power and had the right to
share in the natural father's estate, not that of the adoptive parents.'8 0
Arrogatio, Sdnchez further stipulated, required the consent of both the
child being adopted and the adoptive father.181 For this reason,
Sanchez made clear, an infant might be the subject of simple adop-
tion but could never be adopted by means of arrogatio.a8 2
These rules were repeated, with a few elaborations, by subsequent
generations of canonists. Anacletus Reiffenstuel, unmindful it seems
176 On Sdnchez and his contribution to marriage law, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
POWER TO DISSOLVE: LAWYERS AND MARRIAGES IN THE COURTS OF THE ROMAN CURIA
31-41 (1972).
177 2 TomAS SANCHEZ, DE SANCTO MATRIMONIO bk. 7, at 207-12 (Lyon, Societas
Typographorum 1637).
178 2 id. A necessary heir was one empowered to take a share of that one-quarter
of the father's estate that Roman and Canon law required a father to bequeath to his
children. Id. Sdnchez's conception of "necessary heir" thus differed from the way
this term was employed in classical Roman law. According to W.W. Buckland:
Necessarii heredes These are slaves of the testator freed and instituted by his
will, heredes with no power of refusal. The name applied to all such slaves
freed and instituted, but its most important application was in insolvency.
An insolvent might name a slave as one of his heredes, so that, if others re-
fused, the slave would be heres and the disgrace of insolvency would fall on
him and not on the deceased.
W.W. BUCKLAND, A TExT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 304 (3d
ed. 1963).
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of early medieval and canonistic traditions of informal adoption, de-
clared that adoption was defined by Roman law and was afterwards
received into the Canon law. 183 Following Sinchez and the genera-
tions that had come before him, Reiffenstuel distinguished between
the "perfect adoption" of arrogatio and the "less perfect" adoption of
adoptio simplex.184 Franciscus Schmalzgrueber in many respects simply
followed these teachings.
1 85
Pope Benedict XIV (who reigned from 1740 to 1758), one of the
genuinely great Canon lawyers to serve on the papal throne, drew
upon this heritage to promulgate an adoption law for the universal
Church. Adoption, Benedict asserted, was a Roman law concept that
the Church had "canonized," that is, made its own. 18 6 He recognized
that in many places adoption was a matter for the civil law, by which
he meant the Romanist legal systems then flourishing on the Euro-
pean continent. 87 He accepted the distinction between arrogatio and
simple adoption, but conceded that most questions concerning the
administration of adoption law should have as their starting point the
civil law. 1
88
The second stream of thought shaping the modern Catholic law
of adoption has been the peculiarly American experience of the latter
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although present in North
America from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Catholics be-
gan to arrive in large numbers in the United States with the great
immigrant influx of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 8 9 The
Irish were the first to arrive in substantial numbers, followed by
Germans, both groups beginning their immigrations in the years
before the Civil War. 190 Following the Civil War, Catholics from the
rest of Europe, including Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, Italy, and else-
where, arrived in significant numbers. 191
Many members of these groups suffered extreme social disloca-
tions, made worse by the horrid conditions of urban life and the de-
183 5 ANACLETUS REIFFENSTUEL,JUS CANONICUM UNIVERSUM 458 (Paris, Louis Vivis
1889).
184 5 id.
185 See 4 FRANcIscus SCHMALZCRUEBER, Jus ECCLESIASTICUM UNIVERSUM pt. 2, at
74-75 (Rome, Ex Typographia Reverendae Camerae Apostolicae 1845).
186 2 POPE BENEDICT XIV, OPERA OMNIA 324-25 (Prato, Typographia Aldina 1844).
187 2 id.
188 2 id.
189 For an important account of the years between 1820 and 1920, see JAY P. Do-
LAN, THE AMERICAN CATHOLIC EXPERIENCE: A HISTORY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE
PRESENT 127-57 (Univ. Notre Dame Press 1992) (1985).
190 Id. at 128-31.
191 Id. at 131-36.
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mands of laboring in the least attractive jobs and occupations of
industrializing America. 192 Orphaned children, children born in bro-
ken homes, and children born to unwed mothers, were a regular fea-
ture of this sort of disorganized life.
The leadership of Protestant and Catholic churches alike sought
to alleviate the worst aspects of this life. Especially important to stimu-
lating the direction Catholic adoption took were the efforts of the
Protestant minister Charles Loring Brace, who, in 1854, created the
"placing-out" system to assist in the placement of the children of the
urban poor in "more desirable" family settings in the Midwest and
West. 193 Brace considered Catholicism to be "an inferior, supersti-
tious, servile religion. ' 194 Not surprisingly, his efforts were perceived
as an attempt to break up Catholic homes and to protestantize Catho-
lic children.
95
It was with the explicit purpose of countering Brace's effort that
there was "founded in 1863 the Society for the Protection of Destitute
Roman Catholic Children in the City of New York to ensure that de-
pendent or delinquent Catholic children would be brought up within
the faith."' 96 The New York Society was not the first attempt to pro-
tect Catholic children in the United States. Even before the Civil War,
a foundling home was established in Buffalo in 1852,197 and another
in St. Louis in 1853.198
Catholics, as well as Protestants, made use of the placing-out sys-
tem to place children from the urban Northeast into new homes in
rural America. Linda Gordon's The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction is
an important history of the interaction of Catholic attitudes toward
placing-out and adoption, the regnant Protestant belief system of turn
of the century America, and the hostility, in many parts of Protestant
America, to Hispanic Americans in the desert Southwest.199 Inter-
ested in preserving the Catholic faith of children entrusted to their
care, the Sisters of Charity, who ran a major New York foundling
home, placed a group of largely Irish immigrant children with largely
Hispanic Catholic parents in an Arizona mining town in the fall of
192 Id. at 148-57.
193 MIRIAM Z. LANGSAM, CHILDREN WEST: A HISTORY OF THE PLACING-OUT SYSTEM
OF THE NEW YORK CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY 1853-1890, at 11, 17-32 (1964).
194 LINDA GORDON, THE GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION 11 (1999).
195 Id.
196 CARP, supra note 7, at 14.
197 JOHN O'GRADY, CATHOLIC CHARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY AND
PROBLEMS 129-31 (1930).
198 Id. at 131-32.
199 See GORDON, supra note 194.
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1904.200 The arrival of the Irish orphans split the town between Mexi-
can Catholics, who were to serve as adoptive parents, and Protestant
"Anglos" suspicious of all things Catholic and Mexican; it also led to a
mass kidnapping of the children, the legality of which was sustained
by the United States Supreme Court.
20 1
An important legacy of Catholic efforts to preserve the faith of
the children of the urban poor was the creation of a large network of
adoption agencies and child placement services under the umbrella of
Catholic social services.20 2 The creation of this network has had the
effect of shaping not only Catholic attitudes and law on adoption, but
also that of the larger culture.
In the years after World War II, this network of adoption agencies
and the guidelines and practices they established for themselves
helped to shape American law and culture of adoption, particularly
with respect to the adoption of handicapped children and children of
diverse races and backgrounds. In an article describing the adoption
practices utilized by Catholic Charities of Omaha, Nebraska, in the
years 1949 and 1950, caseworker Betty Hannigan proposed means by
200 Id. at 13-19, 34-43.
201 N.Y. Foundling Hosp. v. Gatti, 203 U.S. 429, 435-36, 441 (1906). The United
States Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Supreme Court of the territory of
Arizona, which condemned the Sisters' placement of "white, Caucasian child[ren]"
with "half-breed Mexican Indians of bad character." Id. at 435-36. The Supreme
Court stressed that at common law "the guardianship of infants" was "one of the emi-
nent prerogatives of the crown." Id. at 439. The Court rejected an argument that the
children were entitled to relief by writ of habeas corpus and stressed instead that the
continuing plenary power of the State for the welfare of these children permitted
their detention:
It was in the exercise of this jurisdiction as parens patriae that the present case
was heard and determined. It is the settled doctrine that in such cases the
court exercises a discretion in the interest of the child to determine what
care and custody are best for it in view of its age and requirements. Such
cases are not decided on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from
unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of an adult, but upon the
court's view of the best interests of those whose welfare requires that they be
in custody of one person or another.
Id.
The Court used this principle to justify the vigilante-style way in which the Protes-
tant-Anglo townspeople removed the children from their placements with Mexican
Catholics: "[A] committee was appointed from the citizens resident of the vicinity,
who visited the homes of the persons having possession of the children, stating to
them that they had been appointed by American residents to take possession of the
children, who were then voluntarily surrendered by such persons." Id. at 436. It is, of
course, the alleged voluntary nature of this whole episode that Gordon's book is in-
tended to refute.
202 GORDON, supra note 194, at 41-43, 71-79.
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which children who were "socially handicapped" might be adopted.20 3
She suggested that caseworkers consider suggesting to prospective
parents "the idea of a specific child with special needs."20 4 In this way,
Hannigan indicated, children with such special needs as cerebral
palsy, partial blindness, and other handicaps were adopted.20 5 Almost
off-handedly, Hannigan noted that where appropriate, Catholic Social
Services of Omaha also sought to place children of mixed racial back-
grounds with parents of different ethnic backgrounds "who match in
other essential ways."
206
Hannigan's article would prove the first of many in Catholic so-
cial service literature identifying means by which Catholic agencies
might act to meet the needs of children entrusted to their care. A
second article published in 1952 explored in greater detail the efforts
being made by Omaha Catholic Charities in the placement of handi-
capped children.20 7 A third article, written by Katherine Price of the
Archdiocese of Denver and published in 1956, stressed the impor-
tance of social workers looking for parents who manifest a "sincere
love" in order to provide homes for physically handicapped children
and children of interracial or entirely different racial backgrounds.20 8
Subsequent articles struck similar themes. 20 9
Many of these early articles suggested the need not just to find
loving parents to adopt children with handicaps, but also to find par-
ents who might consider interracial adoptions.210 These articles sug-
203 See Betty Hannigan, Adoption for Exceptional Children, 34 CATH. CHARITIES REV.
142 (1950).
204 Id. at 143.
205 Id. at 144-45.
206 Id. at 143.
207 Henry R. Evans, Placing the Handicapped Child for Adoption, 36 CATH. CHARITIES
REV. 33 (1952). Evans noted: "Between January 1, 1946, and December 31, 1950, a
total of 237 placements for adoption were made by Catholic Charities of the Archdio-
cese of Omaha, Inc. Of this total 22 or slightly less than 10 percent were physically
handicapped children .... ." Id. at 34.
208 Katherine A. Price, The Challenges of Adoption, CATH. CHARITIES REV., Dec. 1956,
at 12, 12.
209 See, e.g., Mildred Hawkins, Opening Doors for Hard-to-Place Children, CATH. CHARI-
TIES REV., Feb. 1962, at 4 passim (explaining that the adoptive parent's own desire to
become a parent to a minority child is the motivation social workers sought to
strengthen and mobilize); John J. Kane, Adoption, U.S. CATH., June 1967, at 49, 53
(noting that parents who adopt "non-adoptable" children must possess "considerable
courage and deep love of children"); Alice Ogle, Children in Search of a Home, MAR-
RIAGE, May 1960, at 17, 19 (arguing that couples should not just look to adopt the
"perfect" child, but also the hard-to-place child).
210 "'If people can learn to look beyond the proverbial blue-eyed baby they dream
about, their chances of adopting a child are much greater.'" Ogle, supra note 209, at
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gest that Catholic adoption programs began vigorously
recommending interracial adoptions of minority children by white
parents around 1960, focusing at first on the adoption of refugee chil-
dren.2 11 Korean War orphans were a particular concern of early ef-
forts,2 12 and, of course, there were vigorous efforts to place child
victims of the Vietnam War in homes in the United States.
213
American Catholic adoption agencies were also early in promot-
ing the adoption of African-American children by white parents. An
article published in 1964 gave an affirming picture of a transracial
adoption.214 This article was followed by a number of others in the
1960s and early 1970s strongly endorsing interracial adoption. 215 In
this way, the Catholic belief in the sanctity of life and family and in the
universal message of Christ helped to push the development of adop-
tion as a possibility for many children who might otherwise have spent
their formative years in institutions.
17 (quoting Joseph H. Reid, executive director of the Child Welfare League). Simi-
larly, Sidney Callahan has explained:
If the ideal family image in America could become one in which families
opened their hearts and lives to adopt children without families, then a
dreadful social problem could be lessened. The hard-to-adopt racially
mixed child or handicapped child needs adoptive parents who are not only
generous but courageously so.
Sidney Callahan, Have Some, Adopt Some, U.S. CATH. &JUBILEE, Aug. 1970, at 14; see
also Joseph A. Owens, Frontier in Catholic Adoption, VOICE ST. JUDE, Oct. 1960, at 10
(reviewing early developments and noting that "in recent years adoption practices
have taken dramatic and enormous forward strides, with the 134 Catholic agencies
spotted from coast to coast generating much of the thrust").
211 Of course, there was the earlier experiment in the adoption of Caucasian chil-
dren by Hispanic parents foiled by the "great Arizona orphan abduction." See
GORDON, supra note 194 passim.
212 See Rose Lucey, Our Daughter Wore a Tag, SIGN, Aug. 1961, at 13; Robert E.
McDermott, In Focus: Oriental Adoptive Placements, CATH. CHARITIES REV., Apr. 1965, at
24; Daniel P. Quinn, The Placement of Refugee Orphans in the United States, CATH. CHARI-
TIES REV., Sept. 1965, at 13; Betty Simmons, Korean Adoption, ST. ANTHONY MESSENGER,
July 1964, at 15.
213 See, e.g., Thomas C. Fox, A Few Viet Orphans Escape Their Hard Life, NAT'L CATH.
REP., Nov. 2, 1973, at I (detailing the experience of adopting a Vietnamese child in
the post-war climate). This article contained a sidebar entitled How to Adopt a
Vietnamese Child, referring readers to the Catholic Committee for Refugees. Id. at 6.
214 SeeJoe Bartelme, A Home for Billy, CATH. DIG., Aug. 1964, at 48 (detailing the
success story of a white family who adopted a part African-American son).
215 See Diane Martin, Transracial Adoptions, 126 AMERICA 171 (1972); Betty Mazza-
cano, Hard to Place, but Easy to Love, LIGUORIAN, June 1971, at 29; Wayne R. McKinney,
Adoption Can Be Color Blind: Children Need Parents More Than They Need Racial Experience,
CATH. DIG., June 1974, at 112; Ruth Moynihan, Interracial Adoption, MARRIAGE, May
1965, at 10; Ruth B. Moynihan, Love is Color Blind, MARRIAGE, Aug. 1968, at 42.
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The American Catholic experience of adoption, it is fair to say,
has also influenced the attitude of the universal Church toward this
means of forming a family. There is little in the way of formal law on
the subject in contemporary Canon law. The 1983 Code of Canon
Law recognizes that children "who have been adopted in accordance
with the civil law are considered the children of that person or those
persons who have adopted them."21 6 A second provision requires the
recording of children's names and the names of adoptive parents in
baptismal registers. 217 A third provision prohibits marriage between
those related by adoption, as well as those related by blood.
21 8
But even though the law is not especially well developed, the
Catholic magisterium, the "teaching authority" of the Church to which
Catholics are obliged to yield due respect and obedience,219 has had
much to say about adoption in recent years.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church takes up the subject of adop-
tion under the heading "The Gift of a Child. '220 Scripture and the
Church's own tradition, the Catechism proclaims, "see in large families a
sign of God's blessing and the parents' generosity. '" 22 1 Catholic
couples "who discover that they are sterile suffer greatly."222 They are
deprived of the benefits of this gift and despair with Rachel, "Give me
children, or I shall die!"
223
One response to sterility, the Catechism continues, has been the
development of artificial means of conception. These methods are
problematic morally. "Techniques that entail the dissociation of hus-
band and wife, by the intrusion of a person other than the couple
(donation of sperm or ovum, surrogate uterus), are gravely im-
moral." 224 These methods "betray the spouses' 'right to become a fa-
ther and a mother only through each other."' 225 In this context, the
Catechism emphasizes, a child is a gift, not a right.22 6 Physical sterility
216 1983 CODE c.110. This canon essentially brings up to date the teaching of
Pope Benedict XIV "canonizing" the civil law of adoption. See supra notes 186-88 and
accompanying text. It is not, however, bound to the Roman law forms in the same
way as Benedict's teaching.
217 See 1983 CODE c.877, §§ 1, 3.
218 Id. c.1094.
219 Id. c.212, § 1; c.218.
220 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH §§ 2373-2379 (2d ed. 2000).
221 Id. § 2373.
222 Id. § 2374.
223 Id. (quoting Genesis 30:1).
224 Id. § 2376.
225 Id. (quoting 2 SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DONUM
VITAE [THE GIFT OF LIFE] 1 (1987)).
226 Id. § 2378.
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may indeed open other doors. Spouses confronting infertility "can
give expression to their generosity by adopting abandoned
children .... 227
The teaching of the Catechism built upon Pope John Paul II's Ap-
ostolic Exhortation on the Family, issued in 1981, which also praised the
importance of adoption.228 In that document, the Pope stressed that
adoption serves the needs of both adoptive families and children.
"Christian families [should] show greater readiness to adopt and fos-
ter children who have lost their parents or have been abandoned by
them. ' 229 Children so adopted will "rediscover[ ] the warmth of affec-
tion of a family" and thus be enabled "to experience God's loving and
provident fatherhood," while "the whole family will be enriched with
the spiritual values of a wider fraternity.
'230
Recent Church teaching has also stressed, however, that adoption
should ordinarily take place within the context of traditional married
life. The Pontifical Council for the Family has recently taught that
marriage "is a union between a man and a woman, precisely as such,
and in the totality of their male and female essence." 23' Marriage em-
braces the complementary natures of male and female.23 2 It demands
total self-giving of each partner and serves as a sign to the world of
Christ's own love.23
3
It is impossible, the text continued, that homosexual unions
should share these features. 23 4 It is impossible for such unions to be-
come "fruitful through the transmission of life according to the plan
inscribed by God in the very structure of the human being."235 These
unions also frustrate "that interpersonal complementarity between
male and female willed by the Creator at both the physical-biological
and the eminently psychological levels." 236 It would be wrong to con-
fer on such unions the title or dignity of marriage.
The document further made clear that "the attempts to legalize
the adoption of children by homosexual couples add[ ] an element of
227 Id. § 2379.
228 POPE JOHN PAUL II, FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO [THE APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION ON
THE FAMILY], reprinted in 11 ORIGINS 437, 451 (1981).
229 Id.
230 Id.




234 Id. at 40-41.
235 Id. at 41.
236 Id.
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great danger."23 7 This is because "'[t] he bond between two men or
two women cannot constitute a real family and much less can the right
be attributed to that union to adopt children without a family.'
238
The Council concluded that "the common good of society . . .re-
quires the laws to recognize, favor and protect the marital union as
the basis of the family," and this common good would be violated by
extending the adoption laws in this fashion.
23 9
Pope John Paul II's encyclical Evangelium Vitae ( The Gospel of Life)
is famous for its denunciation of the culture of death that the Holy
Father sees expanding its grasp in the western world.2 40 The encycli-
cal begins with a reflection on Cain's murder of Abel.2 41 Neighbors
perpetrate violent acts against neighbors. Cain denied responsibility
for his wrongdoing, just as today "people... refuse to accept responsi-
bility for their brothers and sisters."242 And the fruits of this moral
indifference abound: in the forms of abortion, mass murder, geno-
cide, euthanasia and other acts of "willful self-destruction."
243
In this context, the Pope sees adoption as one palliative to the
destructive trends of the larger culture. The family should serve as an
incubator for a culture and a Gospel of life. 244 The family should be
engaged in daily prayer, in giving glory to God, and in support for one
another. 245 Parents are obliged to teach their children, and the les-
sons they inculcate should include "an example of the true meaning
of suffering and death."
246
Families should be models of love. This love should include at-
tention to "the humble, ordinary events of each day."2 4 7 It must also
embrace "solidarity" with other families engaged in the same spiritual
journey. "A particularly significant expression of solidarity between
families is a willingness to adopt or take in children abandoned by
their parents or in situations of serious hardship."248 The Pope
stresses: "True parental love is ready to go beyond the bonds of flesh
and blood in order to accept children from other families, offering
237 Id. at 42.
238 Id. (quoting Pope John Paul II, Address Before the Angelus (Feb. 20, 1994)).
239 Id. at 43.
240 POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE [THE GOSPEL OF LiF-], reprinted in 24
ORGINs 689, 691-92 (1995).
241 Id. at 692-93.
242 Id. at 693.
243 Id. at 691.
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them whatever is necessary for their well-being and full
development.
249
In sermons, the Pope has made clear that adoption must be seen
as a singular act of love that stands as witness against the dominant
trends of the culture, and that it is also a means by which familial love
can be expanded and extended. Thus, in a sermon delivered to a
gathering of adoptive families, the Pope proclaimed that "adoptive
families provide a valuable witness in the face of self-centered 'contra-
dictions' found in modern society. '250 Where infertile couples are
concerned, adoption is preferable to "morally reprehensible prac-
tices."2 51 Adoption, which is a "gift of self," is also a recognition "that
the relationship between parents and children is not measured solely
by genetic parameters."
25 2
Catholic theologians have begun in recent years to suggest new
frontiers on the subject of adoption. In particular, it has been de-
bated whether the adoption of embryos is permissible, perhaps even
recommended, in light of the sanctity with which their lives, too,
should be regarded. William E. May of the Pope John Paul I Institute
for Studies on Marriage and the Family has written one of the more
extensive treatments of this topic. 253 May concludes:
A married couple can licitly have as their moral object the adoption
of a frozen embryo, a human child abandoned by those who have
generated it. This freely chosen act commits them to further actions,
of which the basic one is to give their adopted child a home, which they
do, first, when the wife/mother chooses to have the frozen embryo
transferred into her womb, and which they continue to carry out by
giving their adopted child, once born, the home provided by both
wife and husband.
254
In closing, one must take note of the prophetic witness of Mother
Teresa of Calcutta. 255 Mother Teresa saw in the West a crisis of love.
Although materially wealthy, western children all too often turn to
drugs and other forms of escape because of the spiritual emptiness of
too many homes.256 The collapse of home life threatens not only the
249 Id.
250 Adoptions Are Hailed as "Work of Love, " NAT'L CATH. REG., Sept. 17, 2000, at 4.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 WILLIAM E. MAY, CATHOLIC BIOETHICS AND THE Gr OF HUMAN LIFE 94-108
(2000).
254 Id. at 107.
255 Mother Teresa, Spiritual Poverty and the Breakdown of Peace, 23 ORIGINS 615
(1994).
256 Id. at 616.
732 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:2
social fabric but peace itself. And abortion is among the greatest
threats to peace: "I feel that the greatest destroyer of peace today is
abortion, because it is a war against the child, a direct killing of the
innocent child .... "257 In this way, Mother Teresa represents a direct
connection to the writers of the early Middle Ages who condemned
the infanticide of the age and recommended adoption as the remedy.
In India, Mother Teresa made vigorous use of adoption as an al-
ternative to abortion. 258 "The child is God's gift to the family. Each
child is created in the special image and likeness of God for greater
things-to love and to be loved."259 Such a creation should not be
killed in the womb. Welcoming such a child into one's home is like
welcoming Jesus Himself: 'Jesus said, 'Anyone who receives a child in
my name, receives me.' By adopting a child, these couples receive
Jesus; but by aborting a child, a couple refuses to receive Jesus. ' 260
III. ADOPTION IN ISLAMIC LAW
To speak of an Islamic law of adoption may strike some as an
oddity or a radical doctrinal innovation. After all, it is well known that
Islamic law prohibits adoption, at least insofar as it would entail a no-
tion of fictive kinship. In this case, however, popular perceptions sim-
plify, mask and distort a complex and subtle body of legal doctrine
that deals with children of unknown parentage. By analyzing the legal
rules articulated during the pre-modern period which govern found-
lings (s. laqft / pl. luqatd), this Part will (1) show that the Islamic law
of foundlings functions as a near substitute for adoption and (2) point
the way to a more robust set of rules that would be more friendly to
quasi-adoptive relationships. It will proceed by describing in broad
outline the principal doctrinal features governing foundlings. This
Part will then attempt to explain the doctrine as a result of a series of
compromises among competing substantive values within the pre-
modern legal system, not all of which could be simultaneously vindi-
cated. Finally, it will conclude with a reassessment of the pre-modern
jurists' interpretation of the foundational revelatory texts upon which
they built their doctrines, thus pointing the way for a reformulation of
Islamic law's prohibition of adoption.
257 Id.
258 Id. "Please don't kill the child. I want the child. Please give me the child. I
am willing to accept any child who would be aborted and to give that child to a mar-
ied couple who will love the child and be loved by the child." Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
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A. Basic Doctrine
Certain well known facts within the Islamic legal tradition but-
tress the notion that Islam categorically prohibits adoption. First, the
revelatory sources of Islamic law, the Qur'dn and the Prophetic tradi-
tions, seem to reject the notion that a person other than the biological
parent of the child can be a parent to that child. Thus, in the case of
mothers, the Qurdn states "[t]heir mothers are only those who have
given birth to them,"2 61 and in the case of fathers, it states,
God did not make those whom you call your sons your sons [in
reality]. That is no more than an expression from your mouths and
God speaks the truth and He guides to the [correct] way. Attribute
them to their fathers: That is more just in the eyes of God, but if you
know not the names of their fathers, then they are your brothers in
faith and your dependents.
262
In commenting upon this verse, exegetes were in agreement that the
verse prohibits a man from adopting a child, at least where adoption is
understood to entail the introduction of a fictive relationship of de-
scent between the child and the adoptive father.
26 3
Indeed, the verse's prohibition was first applied to the adopted
son of the Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet Muhammad had a
freed slave by the name of Zayd b. Hdritha, whom he chose to "adopt"
(tabannd) prior to the advent of Islam. 264 As was the Arab custom of
the pre-Islamic era, Muhammad declared to his fellow tribesmen that
he had adopted Zayd, and from that moment until this verse was re-
vealed, he became known as Zayd, the son of Muhammad, instead of
Zayd, the son of Haritha.2 65 Adoption according to pre-Islamic usage
meant that, for all practical purposes, the adopted child and the adop-
tive father acceded to all the rights and obligations that were incident
to a parent-child relationship, including rights of inheritance as well
as obligations of mutual defense.2 66 Upon the revelation of the verse
that rejected this pre-Islamic practice, Zayd's name was restored to
Zayd, son of Hdritha, but he remained a dependent (mawd) of
261 Qur'dn Al-Mujddila 58:2.
262 Qur'dn Al-Ahzdb 33:4-5.
263 See, e.g., 14 MUHAMMAD B. AmMAD AL-QURTUBI, AL-JAMI' LI-AHKAM AL-QUR'AN
118-19 (1967); 3 ABO AL-QAsim MAHMOD B. 'UMAR AL-ZAMAKHSHARi, AL-KAsHSHAF 'AN
HAQA'IQ AL-TANZIL WA 'UYON AL-AQAWiL WA WUJOH AL-TA'WiL 225-26 (n.d.).
264 14 AL-QURTUBi, supra note 263, at 118-19; 3 AL-ZAMAKHSHARI, supra note 263,
at 225-26.
265 14 AL-QURTUBi, supra note 263, at 118-19; 3 AL-ZAMAKsHARi, supra note 263,
at 225-26.
266 14 AL-QuRTUBi, supra note 263, at 119.
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Muhammad. 2 67 And, with the dissolution of the adoptive relationship
between the two men, their mutual rights of inheritance also dis-
solved, as confirmed by the Qur'dn which states, "[with respect to]
close relatives, some are more deserving than others under the com-
mand of God than the believers and the emigrants, except that you
may choose to do good to your dependents."
268
The verses in Qurdn 33:4-5 could suggest on one reading that as
between a stranger and the biological father, the biological father will
always have a superior claim to being the legal father of the child.
Islamic jurists, however, did not adopt this reading, for the legal desig-
nation of father in Islamic law was not solely a biological matter. In-
stead, fatherhood derived from the concept of legitimate sexual
intercourse-a man could not become the "father" of a child unless
the child was the product of lawful intercourse-and thus combined a
presumption of biological descent with the requirement of a legal
marriage.2 69 This rule was based on a report attributed to the Prophet
where two men came to him, disputing the custody of an orphaned
child. 270 One claimed as the brother of the deceased biological fa-
ther, while the other claimed the child in his capacity as the heir of
the master who owned the child's mother. The Prophet is reported to
have ruled in this case that "[t]he child belongs to the bed, and the
male adulterer gets nothing." 27 1 Muslim jurists applied this princi-
pal-that the male adulterer gets nothing-to prohibit adulterous
males from subsequently gaining status as the legal "father" of the
child. 272 Thus, even if an adulterous male married the mother of his
child, he would not become the legal father of a child illicitly con-
ceived. 273 Accordingly, the Islamic "prohibition" on adoption is a re-
267 3 AL-ZAMAKHSHARi, supra note 263, at 227.
268 Qurdn Al-Ahzdb 33:6.
269 See infra notes 270-75 and accompanying text.
270 12 AHMAD B. 'ALI B. HAJAR AL-'AsQALANi, FATH AL-BARi SHARH SAHiH AL-BuKHARf
36 (1989).
271 12 id. Although in this case the mother was a slave girl, and the child was
ultimately awarded to the master's son, the same rule was also applied to marriages,
with the legal husband being entitled to the child, even if the child was in fact a result
of an adulterous relationship.
272 See infra note 273.
273 This principal was embodied in the maxim that "the sperm of adultery is of no
standing" (rd' al-zind muhdar). Other rules reinforced this prohibition. For example,
adulterous couples were required to wait three months (istibrd' al-zind) from the last
day in which they had intercourse prior to marrying to insure that any child born to
them was conceived as a result of lawful intercourse. Mdlikfs and Hanafis, for exam-
ple, interpreted revelation as prohibiting any relationship of descent between the
adulterous father and his illegitimate offspring (al-shar' qata'a nasabahu 'an al-zdni). 3
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sult of the interaction of two principles: first, that a male adulterer has
no rights in a child born of an illicit relationship, 274 and second, that a
stranger to the child cannot, by mere social convention, accede to the
legal rights and responsibilities of the child's legal father.
2 75
Given this background, the immediate question is how Islamic
law treated children who were legally fatherless, and because of the
prohibition against adoption, could not legally be recognized as the
offspring of any man. The law governing foundlings, I believe, pro-
vides at least part of the answer.
B. The Law of Foundlings as a Substitute Law of Adoption
Given the social stigma of illegitimacy in medieval Muslim socie-
ties, it is not an unreasonable assumption that most children who were
conceived outside of wedlock were abandoned at birth. Indeed, an-
cient MAliki texts explicitly differentiated between a child who is aban-
doned at birth, presumably as a result of the stigma associated from
adultery, and one abandoned by his lawful parents as a result of strait-
ened circumstances in the hope that others better able to provide for
her would find her and take care of her.2 76 These ancient authorities,
therefore, reserved the term manbftdh for the former category,
whereas they limited the term laqit to the latter.2 77 Whether the
foundling was illegitimate or legitimate, however, was immaterial from
the perspective of Islamic law, and to a significant extent, there was
broad agreement among the various Sunni schools of law regarding
the mutual relationships of the foundling, the rescuer (al-multaqit),
and the state.
278
MUHAMMAD AL-KHARSHi, SHARH MUKHTASAR KHALIL LI-L-KHARSHI pt. 2, at 101 (n.d.); see
also 17 MUHAMMAD B. AHMAD AL-SARAKt-s, AL-MABSOT 154 (1993) ("When a man com-
mits adultery with a woman who gives birth as a result thereof, and the male adulterer
claims [paternity of] the child, no parent-child relationship is established because of
the absence of a licit relationship.").
274 In contrast to the rule depriving the adulterous male of any rights in the child,
the adulterous female is given the status of legal mother of any child born of an
adulterous relationship. See 17 AL-SARAKHSi, supra note 273, at 154-55.
275 These could be significant, including, inter alia, the right to receive financial
support from the child upon the father's incapacity and need as well as the right to
inherit from the child if she predeceased the father. Conversely, paternity was also a
source of monetary liability, as the father was responsible to provide for his children
during their minority, and was required to answer monetarily for their torts, even
after their emancipation.
276 See 6 MUHAMMAD B. MUHAMMAD AL-HATrAB, MAWAHIB AL-JALIL LI-SHARH
MUKHTASAR KHALIL 299 (n.d.).
277 6 id.
278 See infra notes 283-301 and accompanying text.
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In this respect, three doctrinal principles were virtually univer-
sally recognized by Muslim jurists in the Middle Ages. First, caring for
foundlings was legally obligatory (wdjib), but the obligation was socie-
tal (fard kifdya), not individual, unless (1) the child was found in a life-
threatening situation, or (2) a person voluntarily took custody of the
foundling. In the first case, the person so finding her becomes indi-
vidually obliged to take custody of the child and care for her. In the
second case, the caregiver remains individually obliged to tend to the
child's needs until: (1) another caregiver (kdfil) is found; (2) the
child reaches the age of majority and is able to fend for himself; or (3)
in the case of a female, the foundling marries.279 Second, the rescuer,
while he could become the caregiver of the child, could not become
the legal parent of the foundling simply by virtue of caring for the
child. Accordingly, the financial rights, e.g., inheritance (irth), and
obligations, e.g., maintenance (nafaqa) and insurance ('aq), that are
incident to parenthood in the case of the foundling devolve upon the
state. 2 0 Third, a foundling was free, and in the absence of compel-
ling evidence, could not be enslaved. 28 ' A closer look at these three
doctrines is in order.
C. Definition of the Foundling and the Obligation to Care for Foundlings
The various schools of Muslim jurisprudence 2 2 were in general
agreement regarding the definition of the foundling. The Malikis de-
279 See, e.g., 4 AL-KHARsis, supra note 273, pt. 1, at 130 ("Caring for the abandoned
child and maintaining her are legal obligations of her rescuer until she reaches the
age of majority and becomes independent.").
280 See infra notes 302-19 and accompanying text.
281 See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
282 Islamic law has been cited as a classic example of a "jurists' law." Prior to the
nineteenth century, Muslim legal scholars developed a vast legal literature that set
forth applicable rules of ritual law, private law, constitutional law, and to a lesser ex-
tent, criminal law. One of the consequences of the centrality of scholarship in the
development of Islamic law was the rise of "legal schools" that arose out of the teach-
ings of particularly learned early authorities, all of whom died in the second and third
Islamic centuries. Historically, four such schools came to dominate legal doctrine for
Sunni Muslims: (1) the Hanafi school, named after Abfi Hanifa al-Nu'mdn b. Thabit;
(2) the Mdliki school, named after Mdlik b. Anas; (3) the Shfi'i school, named after
Muhammad b. Idris al-ShS.fi'i; and (4) the Hanbali school, named after Ahmad b.
Hanbal. AbfQ Hanffa lived in Iraq and subsequently his teachings became the domi-
nant legal school for Muslims living in Iraq, Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the
Indian subcontinent. Mdlik b. Anas lived in the sacred city of Madina, in the western
Arabian province known as the Hijdz. His teachings became the dominant legal
school throughout North and Sub-Saharan Africa, Islamic Spain, and Upper Egypt.
Al-Shfi'i was born in Gaza, Palestine, and studied with the leading authorities of
Madina, including Mdlik b. Anas, and Iraq, including the leading students of AbW
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fined the foundling as "a lost child of unknown parentage. ' 28 3 The
Hanbalis defined the foundling as "a child, up to the age of discern-
ment, whose paternity (nasab) and [status as] slave [or free] are un-
known, who has been abandoned, or is lost. '28 4  The Shfi'is'
definition included all abandoned children who have not reached the
age of majority and have no caregiver.28 5 The Hanafi definition states
that "the foundling is a name for a baby, born alive, whose family has
cast her aside, either out of fear of poverty or suspicion of adul-
tery."' 286 While not explicitly stated by all the jurists, abandonment of
the child is a sinful act, while taking custody of the foundling is
deemed an act of piety.
2 87
Interestingly, the different schools ofjurisprudence relied on dif-
ferent proof-texts in the Qurdn to support the obligation to care for
foundlings. The Hanbalis and the Shdfi'is quote the general obliga-
tion to "cooperate [in all things] good and pious. '28 8 Similarly, the
Qur'dn later states that "whosoever saves a human life, it is as though
he has saved humanity in its entirety," which was also cited as authority
for the merits of caring for foundlings.28 9 The Hanafis also point to a
report that during the reign of 'Ali b. Abi T;lib, the fourth Caliph and
Hanifa. He finally settled and died in Egypt. His doctrines prevailed in Lower Egypt
(including Cairo), much of Syria, Yemen, and in contemporary times, Southeast Asia
and East Africa. Ahmad b. Hanbal lived and taught in Baghdad, and his followers
were limited primarily to that city as well as some Syrian cities. Followers of this
school are numerically the least significant of the four Sunni schools of law, but it is
the official school of law applied in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. For a general
history of the formation of Muslim schools of law, see CHRISTOPHER MELCHERT, THE
FORMATION OF THE SUNNI SCHOOLS OF LAW, 9TH-10TH CENTURIES C.E. (1997).
283 4 AL-KHARSHi, supra note 273, pt. 1, at 130. One commentator noted that
whether or not the child's lineage is known is irrelevant to his status as a foundling.
'Ali al-'Adawi, Hdshiyat al-'adawf, in 4 AL-KHARSHi, supra note 273, pt. 1, at 130 (mar-
gin comment).
284 4 MANSUJR B. Y(NUS B. IDRiS AL-BUHUTi, KASHSHAF AL-QINA' 'AN MATN AL-IQN. '
226 (1982) [hereinafter AL-KASHSHAF]. Many in the Hanbali school permit a child to
be treated as a foundling until she reaches the age of majority.
285 5 ZAKARIYYA B. MUHAMMAD AL-ANsARi, ASNA AL-MATALIB SHARH RAWD AL-TALIB
612 (Muhammad Tamir ed., 2001) [hereinafter ASNA AL-MATALIB].
286 5 Muhammad b. Mahmfid al-BIbarti, Al-Indya sharh al-hiddya, in FATH AL-QADiR
342 (1970) (margin comment).
287 See, e.g., 4 'UTHMAN B. 'ALi AL-ZAYLA'i, TABYN AL-HAQA'IQ SHARH KANZ AL-
DAQA'IQ 200 (Ahmad 'Inaya ed., 2000) ("[T]he one who takes custody of the found-
ling is rewarded, while the one who abandons him is a sinner.").
288 Qurdn al-Mdida 5:2; see, e.g., 6 ZAKARIYA B. MUHAMMAD AL-ANsA~i, AL-GHURAR
AL-BAHIYWA Fi SHARH MANZUMAT AL-BAHJA AL-WARDIYVA 508 (Muhammad 'Ata ed., 1997)
[hereinafter AL-GHURAR]; 4 AL-KASHSHAF, supra note 284, at 226.
289 Qurdn al-Md'ida 5:32; see, e.g., 6 AL-GHURAR, supra note 288, at 508; 4 AL-
ZAYLA'i, supra note 287, at 200.
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the Prophet Muhammad's son-in-law, a man came to him with a
foundling, and 'Ali said to him: "He is free, and I would rather have
participated in his affairs to the same degree that you [have partici-
pated] than this, this, and this [i.e., a laundry list of pious acts]," thus
demonstrating the great religious merit of caring for foundlings.
2 9 0
The Hanafis also cited a tradition of the Prophet Muhammad, in
which he was reported to have excluded those who are cruel to chil-
dren from the ranks of the Muslim community.
29 1
The principal policy imperative giving rise to the obligation to
rescue abandoned children was to save life. Thus, Ibn Rushd, an An-
dalusian Maliki jurist, stated that "taking [custody] of a foundling is
obligatory because were he to be left [in his condition], he would be
lost and die."29 2 Similarly, the Hanafi author of the Tabyin notes that
rescuing the foundling becomes an individual obligation of anyone
who discovers the foundling in life-threatening circumstances.2 93 The
Shdfi'is cite the same principal, e.g., saving life,2 9 4 in support of the
rule that rescuing a foundling who has been abandoned in life-threat-
ening circumstances is obligatory. This is in contrast to their ruling
that taking possession of lost property, while meritorious, is not a legal
obligation. The two cases are distinguishable in that the law already
provides individuals with sufficient incentives to take possession of lost
or abandoned property, since in due course, finders might become
the lawful owners of such property. In the case of abandoned chil-
dren, however, no economic benefit will accrue to a rescuer, and thus
introducing the threat of legal liability is appropriate.
2 9 5
290 See infra note 291.
291 4 AL-ZAYLA'I, supra note 287, at 200 (quoting the Prophet Muhammad as say-
ing, "[w]hosoever does not show mercy to our children . . . is not one of us").
292 6 MUHAMMAD B. YCJSUF AL-MAWWAQ AL-TAJ WA-AL-IKLIL 71 (n.d.).
293 4 AL-ZAYLA'i, supra note 287, at 200-01. The Hanafi author explained:
[Taking custody of the foundling] is commendable if the [foundling] is dis-
covered in circumstances in which it is unlikely that she would die, as is the
case were she to be found in a city... but [taking custody of the foundling]
becomes obligatory if it is likely the foundling will perish [if she is not imme-
diately rescued], as is the case were she to be discovered in the desert or
some other dangerous location, in order to protect her from death.
4 id.
294 6 AL-GHURAR, supra note 288, at 508.
295 See 3 AHMAD B. AHMAD AL-QALYOBI, HASHIYATA QALYUB1 WA 'UMAYRA 188 (1997)
(" [The foundling] differs from lost property insofar as taking custody of the latter is
not obligatory ... because profit is the primary motive [with respect] to [taking cus-
tody of] it and human nature is disposed to [taking custody] of it, so it was unneces-
sary to make it obligatory.").
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Upon taking custody of a foundling, whether or not legally obli-
gatory, the majority of Muslim jurists concluded that the rescuer be-
came obliged to care for the foundling until such time as another
caregiver could be found (including a judge as representative of the
state) or the child reached the age of majority.29 6 The MOiks' posi-
tion is unique. They permit the rescuer to return the foundling to the
place where he was found if (1) the rescuer took custody of the found-
ling for the sole purpose of delivering him to the judge, i.e., the re-
sponsible public authority; (2) the responsible public authority
refused to accept the foundling; and (3) the foundling will not be
abandoned in a location in which his life would be threatened. 297 Al-
though the rescuer is obliged to care for the foundling, this obligation
does not entail more than providing physical protection and educa-
tional direction.298 The rescuer is always free, but is not obliged, to
provide for the financial needs of the foundling. If he does so pro-
vide, he generally acts as a volunteer 299 with no recourse against the
foundling or the foundling's father, if and when he is identified, to
296 See, e.g., 5 ASNA AL-MATALIB, supra note 285, at 614.
[I]f he [the rescuer] is unable to care for him [i.e., the foundling] .. .then
..* he delivers him to the judge. Indeed, he can turn him over [to] the
judge solely because he has grown tired of caring for him or for any other
reason, even if he is still able to care for him ... but it is illegal for him to
abandon him or to return him to where he was [found].
5 id.
297 See, e.g., 6 AL-MAwwAQ, supra note 292, at 82.
[H]e [i.e., the rescuer] shall not return him [i.e., the foundling] after taking
custody of him unless he took custody of him solely to deliver him to the
state, which did not accept him, and the place [where he leaves the found-
ling] is well-traveled .... The judge Abfi al-Walid said, "This means in my
opinion that the place must be one where there is no fear that he [i.e., the
foundling] would perish because of the throngs of people therein and that
he [i.e., the rescuer] is certain that people will hasten to take custody of him
[i.e., the foundling]."
6 id.
298 See, e.g., 5 ASNA AL-MATALIB, supra note 285, at 614.
The rescuer is obliged to protect the foundling and oversee his develop-
ment, i.e., raise him, because those are the purposes of taking custody of
him, not to provide for his financial needs or to provide him with a nurse [in
his infancy] . . .for those are a tremendous burden and great expense.
5 id.
299 3 MALIK B. ANAS, AL-MUDAWWANA AL-KUBRA 382 (n.d.) [hereinafter MALIK].
I said, "What is the rule if a person rescues a foundling, takes him to the
public authorities, and they order him to care for him and provide for him
financially?" Mdlik said, "The foundling, amounts spent on him are for the
sake of God, and the one who maintains him does so only expecting divine
reward."
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recover amounts advanced to maintain the foundling. However, re-
course against the child's father is permitted if (1) the rescuer, at the
time he advanced the funds, had subjectively intended to seek repay-
ment from the foundling's father for those expenses, and (2) the fa-
ther, at the time the rescuer advanced the funds, was solvent.3 0 0 The
Hanafis also contemplated recourse against the foundling if funds ad-
vanced by the rescuer for the benefit of the foundling were approved
by a court.
3 0 1
D. Supporting the Foundling: Who is Responsible?
If Muslim jurists were in general agreement that the rescuer was
not legally obliged to maintain the foundling out of his own funds,
how were the health, welfare and education of the foundling to be
financed? In the first instance, any property of the foundling, includ-
ing property found on or near his person, was to be spent upon his
upkeep.30 2 Likewise, any gifts that were given to the foundling, or any
funds received from trusts established for the benefit of foundlings,
could be applied by the foundling's caregiver toward the foundling's
expenses.3 0 3 The general rule was that the rescuer could accept such
charitable sums given to the foundling on her behalf, but the Shafi'is
obliged the rescuer to notify the court of any such property and to
seek the judge's permission prior to spending the foundling's prop-
erty. 30 4 The rescuer could also spend reasonably from his own funds
for the maintenance of the foundling, with the expectation of recover-
ing from the foundling in the future with the permission of a judge.
However, in these circumstances, the foundling could not, upon
reaching majority, expect an accounting from the rescuer, or sue to
3 id.; see also 10 AL-SARAK-Si, supra note 273, at 210 ("[I]f the rescuer supports [the
foundling] financially, he is a volunteer with respect to such support."); 4 AL-ZAYLA'i,
supra note 287, at 201 ("[I]f the rescuer were to support [the foundling] from his own
property, it is a gift, for he has no authority to compel.").
300 See 6 AL-HATrAB, supra note 276, at 193-94.
301 6 ABO BAKR B. MAS'OD AL-KAs&r'J, BADA'i AL-SANA'I' Fi TARTiB AL-SHARA'I' 199
(1974) ("If [the rescuer] maintains [the foundling] out of his own property, he has
recourse against him if he did so with the permission of the judge, but if he did so
without his permission, then he has no recourse against him because he is a
volunteer.").
302 See 3 MANSOR B. YJNUS AL-BUHOTi, SHARH MUNTAHA AL-IRA[DA'T 482 (1979)
("[H]e is to be maintained from that which is [found] with him."); 6 AL-GHURAR,
supra note 288, at 518; 6 AL-KAsAr'N, supra note 301, at 199 (explaining that there is no
public obligation to support the foundling if she has her own property); 4 AL-KHAR-
SHi, supra note 273, pt. 1, at 131.
303 4 AL-KHARSH!, supra note 273, pt. 1, at 131.
304 6 AL-GHURAR, supra note 288, at 518.
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recover from the rescuer amounts unreasonably spent in the absence
of evidence of the rescuer's negligence.
30 5
If the foundling's private resources, as supplemented from time
to time by private charity, were not sufficient to maintain him, the
jurists obliged the state to provide sufficient funds to meet the found-
ling's financial needs.3 0 6 In support of this proposition, the jurists of
all schools relied upon a precedent established during the reign of
the Caliph 'Umar b. al-Khatt~b, the second Caliph of Islam. Imam
Mdlik b. Anas, the eponym of the Mdliki legal school, reported that a
man found an abandoned child during the reign of 'Umar b. al-Khat-
tAb. 30 7 He appeared before 'Umar who asked him why he had taken
custody of that child. He replied that the child was lost, so he took
him.30 8 At this point, the man's commanding officer cried out, "Oh
Commander of the Faithful, he is a virtuous man!" 'Umar asked him
whether this was so, and when he replied yes, 'Umar said, "Go! He
[i.e., the foundling] is free, and you are in charge of his upbringing,
and we are obliged to provide for him.
'30 9
Islamic law therefore provided that the expenses associated with
raising foundlings was an obligation that belonged to the entire com-
munity,3 10 and accordingly, a portion of the resources of the public
fisc were to be dedicated to that task. The jurists differed, however, in
what to do when the fisc lacked adequate resources to maintain a
foundling. For the Hanbalis and the Shfi'is, the public fisc, if it
lacked funds, was obliged to borrow money from the public in order
to meet its obligation to foundlings.3 1 ' Indeed, the Shfis went so
far as to suggest that, in the event the public fisc could not find some-
one who would voluntarily lend money to the state for this purpose,
the government could compel, on a per capita basis, wealthy individu-
als-including the ruler in his personal capacity-to lend money to
the state to fund the financial needs of a foundling.3 12 MMiki doc-
305 See 4 AL-KASHSHAF, supra note 284, at 228.
306 See infra notes 310-13 and accompanying text.
307 7 WALiD B. SULAYMAN AL-BAJi, AL-MUNTAQA SHARH AL-MUWATrA' 328 (1999).
308 7 id.
309 7 id.
310 See 6 AL-GHURAR, supra note 288, at 510 (protecting and raising the foundling,
after she has been rescued, is also a societal obligation).
311 See, e.g., 5 ASNA AL-MATALIB, supra note 285, at 617; 6 'ALI B. SULAYMAN AL-
MARDAWI, AL-INSAF Ft MA'RAFIT AL-RAJIH MIN AL-KHIAF 'ALA MADHHAB AL-IMAM AL-MUBAJ-
JAL AHMAD B. HANBAL 433 (Muhammad Fiqi ed., 1980).
312 5 ASNA AL-MATALIB, supra note 285, at 617 ("If the fisc lacks funds.., the ruler
borrows [from those willing to lend] but if that fails, he divides the obligation among
the wealthy (to be treated as a loan to the fisc), including himself, or among those
whom he selects in his good-faith discretion, if they are numerous . . ").
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trine, however, did not contemplate public borrowing to fund the
needs of foundlings. Instead, the jurists of this school obliged the res-
cuer in these circumstances to provide for the financial needs of the
foundling in his custody.
3 1 3
The public was not only responsible in the first instance for pro-
viding for the foundling's material needs, the Muslim jurists also held
that it was monetarily responsible for torts committed by the found-
ling while in the custody of his rescuer.3 14 Additionally, the public was
the foundling's legal heir until such time as the foundling became an
adult and produced heirs of her own.3 15 The Hanafis, however,
treated this rule as a default rule, and thus provided the foundling
with an option to opt out of her status as a ward of the state by enter-
ing into a contractual relationship of guardianship (wald') with an
individual member of the Muslim community.3 16 So long as this rela-
tionship was created prior to a time when the public was called upon
to answer for the foundling's torts, the contract was valid.31 7 In this
case, the foundling's private contract displaced the public from its
twin roles as insurer of the foundling's torts and its legal heir. The
party with whom the foundling contracted then became answerable
monetarily for the foundling's torts, and became the foundling's legal
heir if the foundling died without another heir.3
18
It should be understood, however, that the duty of providing for
the foundling was ultimately derivate of the father's obligation to pro-
vide for his children. For that reason, if and when the foundling's
father was found, the foundling was returned to him and the father
resumed his duty of providing for the foundling's material and emo-
tional well being. The jurists disagreed, however, on what kind of
proof was needed to establish the paternity of a foundling. The
313 4 AL-KHARSH!, supra note 273, pt. 1, at 130 (stating that taking care of the
foundling and maintaining her financially are obligatory upon her rescuer, if funds
are not provided from the public fisc).
314 See, e.g., 6 AL-GHURAR, supra note 288, at 532 ("compensation of the found-
ling's torts (negligent and reckless) are an obligation of the public fisc"); 6 AL-KAsAM,
supra note 301, at 199 (noting that unless the foundling establishes a relationship of
dependency (wald') with a specific person, the public treasury is liable for his torts); 6
AL-MAwwAQ, supra note 292, at 81 (attributing to 'Umar b. al-KhattAb the view that the
public fisc is liable for the torts of foundlings).
315 See 3 AL-BUHOT, supra note 302, at 485 (stating that the public is the found-
ling's heir); 6 AL-KAsNi, supra note 301, at 199 (stating that the government is the
foundling's successor).
316 6 AL-KAsAW, supra note 301, at 199.
317 6 id.
318 In effect, the contractual guardian would be guaranteed to inherit something
from the foundling unless the foundling died with legitimate male offspring.
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Malikis were the strictest, requiring third party witnesses to testify to
the fact that the foundling was the legitimate child of the claimant;
however, the other schools were more accommodating, and would
simply accept an admission of paternity from the claimant, in light of
the foundling's need for a legal father who would become legally obli-
gated to provide for him.
319
E. The Freedom of the Foundling
A fundamental feature of the doctrine of foundlings in Islamic
jurisprudence was that the foundling was free. 320 The fear that an
abandoned child might become enslaved clearly haunted the
thoughts of Muslim jurists. Indeed, this fear-in addition to the possi-
bility that the child could die-was one of the concerns that drove the
jurists to describe the duty of rescuing foundlings as obligatory. Be-
cause there were no legitimate domestic sources of slaves other than
the offspring of slaves,3 21 the legal assumption with respect to all
births within the territories in which Islamic law reigned supreme was
that persons were free.3 22 Accordingly, distinguishing between found-
lings and enslaved children was an evidentiary problem of the first
order, a problem that was perhaps never adequately resolved. Also,
because slaves could be lawfully imported into Islamic territory, a
moral hazard existed with respect to foundlings: instead of taking cus-
tody of a foundling to save her life, the would-be rescuer might be
tempted instead to claim the child as a slave.
319 See 6 AL-MAwwAq, supra note 292, at 82 ("[T]he foundling does not become
the child of his rescuer or of anyone else in the absence of the testimony of witnesses
or other convincing evidence [explaining how the child was lost].").
320 See, e.g., 2 MALIK, supra note 299, at 398 ("Malik said: 'The foundling is free.'");
4 MUHAMMAD B. MUFLIH AL-MAQDISi, KITAB AL-FURO' 574 ('Abd al-Latif al-Subki ed.,
1982) ("He [i.e., the foundling] ... is free."); 8 AL-SAAKHsi, supra note 273, at 113
("The foundling is free, the public is his heir and it is liable for his torts."); 4 MuIAM-
MAD B. IDRiS AL-SHAFI'f, AL-UMM 70 (n.d.) (stating that the foundling is free).
321 If the father of the child was also the master of the slave who gave birth to the
child, the child was deemed free.
322 Slaves under Islamic law must originate outside the territory of the Islamic
state, for enslavement of a free person within Islamic territories was strictly forbidden.
See 10 AL-SARAKsI, supra note 273, at 209 ("[T]he foundling is presumptively free in
light of the [legal] presumption [of freedom] and [the law of Islamic] territories [in
which he was born]."). A free person residing outside of the domains of the Islamic
state, however, could be legitimately enslaved if he were not a Muslim. The person
could then be imported into the territories of an Islamic state as a slave, just as any
other property acquired outside of the borders of an Islamic state could be imported
by its owner to an Islamic state.
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Muslim jurists attempted to prevent the enslavement of found-
lings by their rescuers through the use of legal presumptions of free-
dom, differing only in regard to the strength of such presumptions.
3 23
To buttress the presumptions of freedom, rescuers of foundlings were
either encouraged or required to appear before a court in order to
memorialize the identity of the foundling, thereby establishing bind-
ing evidence of the foundling's freedom.
324
The Shd.fi'is' position in this respect was the most protective of
the freedom of foundlings. Not only did the Shfi'is presume that all
minors were free, they would also reject evidence to the contrary un-
less the witnesses could testify in detail as to the manner by which such
minor became a slave. 325 The Shdfi'is also required rescuers to ap-
pear before a court with the foundling in order to receive any of the
legal benefits of a rescuer. 326 Likewise, if a rescuer failed to appear
before a judge in this manner, the judge was entitled to remove the
child from the rescuer's custody.327 At the opposite end of the spec-
trum were the Hanafis, who were more indulgent of claims of slavery
than were the Shfifi'is. Thus, while the Hanafis agreed that all found-
lings were free, if the possessor of a child claimed the existence of a
master-slave relationship rather than a rescuer-foundling relationship,
the Hanafis were inclined to accept the claim.
328
323 See infra notes 325-28 and accompanying text.
324 See 3 AL-BUHfJTi, supra note 302, at 478 (noting that it is desirable for the
foundling's rescuer to notify the court that he discovered the foundling so that he
does not enslave her in the future).
325 See al-Muzani, Mukhtasar al-muzani, in 8 AL-SHAMI'i, supra note 320, at 137. The
author, al-Muzani, quotes al-Sh~i'i as saying:
If a man claims that a foundling is his slave, I do not accept his witnesses
unless they testify that they saw the slave-girl of so-and-so give birth to
him .... I am reluctant to accept the testimony of witnesses [who testify
simply that he is his slave] because [the child] might be seen in the man's
possession, and the witnesses might testify on that basis [alone].
Id. Note, however, that al-Muzani also quotes al-ShM'i'i as holding a contrary opin-
ion, which al-Muzani described as the stronger position. Id.
326 See 5 AsNA AL-MATALIB, supra note 285, at 611; 6 AL-GHURAR, supra note 288, at
509-10.
327 5 ASNA AL-MATLIB, supra note 285, at 611 ("When [the foundling] is res-
cued... giving notice to the court of the foundling.., and of any property [found]
with him, is obligatory . . . and if [the rescuer] does not give such notice, the court
may remove the child and whatever property is with him from such rescuer"); 6 AL-
GHURAR, supra note 288, at 509-10.
328 7 AL-SARAKuHSi, supra note 273, at 172.
A small boy, who lacks capacity, is in the custody of a man, who says "This is
my slave"; it is as he says, so long as the contrary is not known, for the boy has
no possession over himself, and therefore there is no claim to the contrary
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F. Tensions Within the Legal Doctrine
Despite the broad agreement they enjoyed among medieval Mus-
lim jurists, the legal doctrines governing the foundling were charac-
terized by a profound tension between two competing paradigms-a
tension that is reflected more broadly in Islamic family law generally.
The first approach treats legal questions dealing with the foundling
from the perspective of the best interests of the foundling. The sec-
ond places greater emphasis on the unknown parents of the found-
ling and is best characterized as a parental rights paradigm rooted in
concepts of property law.
Principles of property law permeate the jurists' discussions of is-
sues relating to the financial needs of the foundling and the alloca-
tion of the various rights and duties between the rescuer, on the one
hand, and the "public" as represented by the state, on the other. For
example, in reiterating the notion that the public fisc is the heir of the
foundling, as well as the insurer of his torts, some jurists appealed to a
well known principal of property law, al-khardj bi-l-damdn (profit is
only with risk of loss).329
Once it is assumed that the rescuer cannot become a legal parent
by virtue of his custodial relationship with the foundling, this princi-
ple becomes the key to understanding many details of the legal doc-
trine. Because the rescuer is not a legal parent, he is not entitled to
inherit from the foundling, nor is he entitled to receive financial sup-
port from the foundling in the rescuer's old age. 330 Conversely, be-
cause the rescuer, unlike a legal parent, has no claims to the financial
assets of the foundling, he cannot be held monetarily liable for the
torts of the foundling. 331 Another example of the dominance of the
parental-property-rights paradigm is the rule regarding the financial
liability of the foundling's father. Under Islamic law, a father cannot
renounce financial liability for his children.332 Thus, if the rescuer
[before the court], so the claim of the man holding him is established [by
default] against [the boy]. What is in the man's custody is his property by all
appearances, so if he claims what is corroborated by appearances, his claim
is given credence just as would be the case if he held in his possession a beast
of burden or a dress, and said, "This belongs to me."
7 id.
329 See 6 AL-KAsA&I, supra note 301, at 199.
330 See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
331 See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
332 4 AL-KAsHSHFA, supra note 284, at 227 (noting that the government has re-
course against the foundling's father, if and when he is discovered, for amounts spent
in rearing the foundling, assuming the father was solvent, because in that case, he was
obliged to provide for the needs of his child).
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can show that the father was solvent at the time the rescuer main-
tained the foundling, then he can potentially recover such funds from
the father on the theory that under the circumstances, the rescuer's
advance of funds on behalf of the foundling was merely a discharge of
the father's indebtedness.3 33 Accordingly, those doctrines of the law
of foundlings which allocate economic responsibilities seem to be
straightforward applications of fundamental concepts of property law.
On the other hand, the property paradigm also appears in con-
texts that would seem distant from economic matters. For example, a
particularly thorny question that the law of foundlings had to deal
with was the foundling's religion. In principle, the foundling took the
religion of his parents, a principle that lies comfortably within a vision
of the family where children are the quasi-property of the parents.
33 4
But, because the identity of the foundling's parents was unknown,
other techniques had to be used to assign a religion to the foundling.
One such technique was to consider the place where the foundling
was discovered: If she was found in a church, she would be deemed a
Christian, or if in a synagogue, a Jew, but otherwise she would be
deemed a Muslim. 33 5 Others took a probabilistic approach: If the ma-
jority of a town or village where the foundling was discovered was of a
particular religion, then the parents of the foundling would be as-
sumed to have come from the majority religious group.3 36 But in a
significant departure from the focus on the parents of the foundling,
other jurists insisted that a foundling should be deemed a Muslim if
there is any theoretical possibility that one of the child's parents was a
333 4 id.
334 See 10 AL-SARAK-si, supra note 273, at 62 (quoting the Prophet Muhammad as
saying, "Every child is born subject to the natural [faith of primitive monotheism],
and his parents make him a Jew, a Christian or a Magian, until such time as he can
speak for himself, either giving thanks to God or rejecting Him," in support of the
legal presumption that children take the religion of their parents).
335 5 MuHAmMAD B. 'ABD AL-WAHID IBN AL-HUmAM, SHARH FATH AL-QADiR 345
(1970) ("If he [i.e., the foundling] is discovered in a village of non-Muslims, or in a
synagogue or a church, he is a non-Muslim.").
336 3 MAULIK, supra note 299, at 384-85.
I believe that if [the foundling] was in a town or city of Islam, or where
[Muslims] live, I deem him a Muslim, but if he was discovered in the cities of
non-Muslims or those of the protected [non-Muslim] peoples, I deem him to
be a non-Muslim, and he should be left alone. If [the rescuer], found him
in a village wherein there are both Muslims and Christians, it must be taken
into consideration whether there are only one or two Muslims with the
Christians ... in which case he belongs to the Christians and should be left
alone.
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Muslim, viz., if even one person in the village was a Muslim. 3 3 7 This
rule, they said, was necessary to assure that the foundling's interests
were fully protected, including his interest in avoiding enslavement.
338
While there is no doubt that this rule also incorporated elements of
belief in the religious superiority of Islam to Christianity and Judaism,
it would be incorrect to assume that Islamic law systematically privi-
leged Muslims over Christians and Jews. In fact, in many circum-
stances, the law, at least with respect to foundlings, treated Muslims,
Christians, and Jews equally.33 9 Thus, it seems that for those jurists
who advocated what was a virtual legal presumption of Muslim de-
scent for foundlings, the determinative consideration, so long as there
was no proof of the identity of the true parent, was the perceived best
interest of the child.
This was not the only circumstance in which the interests of the
child were given greater weight than the putative rights of the missing
parents, or the caregiver who was temporarily in charge of the child.
In disputes concerning who should be the custodian of the foundling,
the first in time principle generally was outcome determinative, so
long as that custodian was deemed fit.3 40 If it was impossible to deter-
mine which of the claimants first took custody of the child, or if the
first to take custody was not fit, the court would award custody based
on its perception of the child's interests.3 41 The foundling could also
be removed from the care of an immoral caregiver or one prone to
squander property.342 Similarly, it was prohibited for the rescuer, if
he was a bedouin, for example, to take the child from a city or village
337 5 ASNA AL-MATALIB, supra note 285, at 620 ("If the foundling is discovered in
territory subject to the laws of Islam... and there is a single Muslim living there who
could be the parent, even if he denies it .... the foundling is deemed a Muslim.").
338 See 5 id.; 7 AL-BAfl, supra note 307, at 331 (quoting an early Mliki as holding
that, in a dispute between a Muslim and a non-Muslim over who should have custody
of a foundling, custody should be given to the Muslim "so as to insure that he does
not make him a Christian, or that [the foundling's] affairs become forgotten and he
becomes enslaved"); 6 AL-GHuRAR, supra note 288, at 522-24.
339 See, e.g., 6 AL-GHURAR, supra note 288, at 512 (stating that priority is not given
to a Muslim claimant over a non-Muslim claimant unless the child is deemed to be a
Muslim); 3 MALIK, supra note 299, at 60 (holding that if a non-Muslim claims pater-
nity of a child in the custody of a Muslim, he is awarded the child if he can prove
paternity).
340 5 ASNA AL-MATALIB, supra note 285, at 613.
341 5 id.
342 See, e.g., 6 AL-GHuRAR, supra note 288, at 510-11 (stating that the caregiver
must neither be immoral nor a spendthrift); 4 AL-MAQDISi, supra note 320, at 576-77
(noting that the foundling is not to be left in the custody of a caregiver who is im-
moral, untrustworthy or a spendthrift).
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to the desert, or even from a city to a village. 343 The justification given
for this rule was straightforward: In addition to the great hardship and
deprivation that is attendant to a life in the desert among nomadic
people or among villagers, life in a city would assure moral, educa-
tional and economic opportunities for the child that could not be
found either in the desert or small villages. 344 And in cases where the
judge could neither determine that the rescuer was of good character
or bad character, the Shlfii'ls, while awarding him custody of the
child, imposed a duty on the government to surreptitiously monitor
the conduct of the caregiver (but under court supervision) to insure
that the caregiver did not harm the child.
3 4 5
Another area of the law of foundlings in which the best interests
of the child is the dominant theme concerns the rules dealing with
admissions of paternity (al-iqrdr bi-l-nasab). The Hanbalis and the
Hanafis gave force to admissions of paternity without asking for any
proof.346 In defense of this rule, the Hanafis made an-express appeal
to the best interests of the child.3 4 7 While admitting that rigorous ap-
plication of legal principles would demand that the party claiming to
be the foundling's father produce proof for his claim, Al-I-sdni ar-
gued that compelling policy considerations, in favor of both the child
and the putative parent, justified giving force to an admission of pater-
nity unsupported by objective evidence. 3 48 The relative laxity in this
343 See 4 AL-KASHSHAF, supra note 284, at 229; 6 AL-MARDAWi, supra note 311, at
441.
344 6 AL-GHURAR, supra note 288, at 516.
345 6 id. at 510; see also 5 ASNA AL-MATALIB, supra note 285, at 613.
346 See, e.g., 6 AL-MARDAWi, supra note 311, at 452 ("[I]f a person acknowledges
that [the foundling] is his child, paternity is established, whether the claimant is a
Muslim or a non-Muslim, man or woman, and whether the foundling is dead or
alive."); 4 AL-ZAYLA'i, supra note 287, at 202-03 (explaining that the paternity of the
foundling can be established equally by the admission of either the rescuer or a third
party).
347 10 AL-SARAKHSi, supra note 273, at 214 (arguing that a claim of paternity bene-
fits the foundling).
348 6 AL-KAsANi, supra note 301, at 199.
Policy justifies [accepting an admission of paternity in this context] because
[it] is a report regarding something that may be true and it is obligatory to
accept reports that may be true, if only to give [the speaker] the benefit of
the doubt, unless accepting the report's truth harms a third party. Here,
however, accepting the report and establishing a relationship of paternity is
beneficial to both: [It is beneficial for] the foundling by providing him with
the dignity of paternity, education and protection from death and injury as
well as other benefits. [It is beneficial for] the putative parent by providing
him with a child who can assist him in satisfying his religious and secular
needs.
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regard of the Hanafis and the Hanbalis is to be contrasted with the
rigour of the Mdlikis, who would not admit claims of paternity absent
proof that the child was the legal child of the person claiming her.
3 49
Shdfi'i doctrine seems ambiguous on this point, with the same author-
ity implying that admissions of paternity, with respect to foundlings,
350
are valid without any proof of paternity, and in another context ex-
cluding the possibility that such an admission could be legally effec-
tive if the child was illegitimate.
351
The express commitment to the best interest of the child is clear-
est in Hanafi doctrine. - 52 The Hanafis, for example, will take at face
value the claim by any man that he is the father of the foundling, but
only to the extent that such a claim benefits the foundling.353 Thus, if
a non-Muslim or a slave were to claim paternity of the child, the
Hanafis would recognize the claimant's paternity (nasab) for purposes
of establishing the parent-child relationship, but would not enforce all
the normal incidents of parenthood. 354 If the child is claimed by a
non-Muslim, but the child has already been deemed a Muslim by vir-
tue of the location in which he was found, he would continue to be
raised as a Muslim. Similarly, if the person acknowledging the found-
ling as his child is a slave, the child would not be enslaved based on
6 id.
349 6 AL-MAwwAQ, supra note 292, at 82 (stating that the foundling is not deemed
the child of his rescuer or anyone else without adequate proof of paternity).
350 5 ASNA AL-MATALIB, supra note 285, at 626.
Whosoever' claims the foundling becomes his parent without the testimony
of witnesses or expert testimony because he has admitted an obligation so it
resembles [the case of] one who admits a debt, and because requiring wit-
nesses in order to prove paternity is difficult, and were the mere claim of
paternity [in these circumstances] not sufficient to establish paternity, the
paternity of many would be lost.
5 id.
351 5 id. at 171 (stating that a child conceived as a result of illicit sexual inter-
course cannot be attributed to the father).
352 4 AL-ZAvLA'I, supra note 287, at 203.
[T]he admission [of paternity] of the child is beneficial to him, because he
is ennobled by the [recognition of] paternity while he is harmed by the ab-
sence [of such a relationship], as he will be stigmatized as a result [of being
of unknown parentage]. He also gains one who will be responsible to care
for him and to provide for his needs out of desire, not [one who is] holding
over him his favors.
4 id. Thus, the Hanafis will accept the rescuer's claim of paternity even though it
contradicts his earlier claim that the child was a foundling. 4 id.
353 See 17 AL-SARAK~si, supra note 273, at 128-29.
354 See 17 id.
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that admission, but he would enjoy the benefits of a parent-child
relationship.
3 55
G. Conclusions on Islamic Law and Adoption
Although traditional Islamic law prohibits adoption, at least inso-
far as it creates a fictive relationship of descent between the adoptive
parent and the child, it was not indifferent to the plight of abandoned
children. The law of foundlings was the principal area of Islamic juris-
prudence that dealt with the social problems created by the two main
causes of child abandonment: illegitimacy and poverty. Unfortu-
nately, the law's ability to confront these problems directly was ham-
pered by the unresolved tension between a paradigm of parental
rights which relied on concepts of property law and a paradigm that
put as a priority the best interests of the child. Once this tension is
made clear, one can re-read the foundational texts of Islamic law with
a view to resolving these tensions and creating new legal doctrine that
would be more sympathetic to quasi-adoptive relationships.
The first step in reinterpreting inherited legal doctrine would be
a reconsideration of the Prophetic dictum, "the child belongs to the
bed, and the male adulterer gets nothing."356 First, one could distin-
guish this precedent from adoption on its own facts, insofar as this
dictum was a ruling in the context of a custody dispute. The prece-
dent then, instead of standing for the proposition that no relationship
exists between an adulterous father and his offspring, could be viewed
to stand for the proposition that notwithstanding adultery, a child
born in a legally recognized family is a part of that family, unless the
legal father takes steps to disavow paternity.3 57 One could also point
out that the Prophetic ruling speaks only of the rights of the adulter-
ous father, but is silent as to his obligations. If one were to take a "best
interest of the child" approach to this precedent, one could argue that
the ruling stands for the proposition that the adulterous father enjoys
none of the benefits of paternity, but remains accountable for the ob-
ligations of paternity, to the extent no legitimate father exists.
It appears that this reading was not countenanced because of the
interplay between parental rights and the principles of property law.
The medieval jurists must have reasoned that, to the extent the adul-
355 See 17 id. at 129.
356 See supra notes 271-75 and accompanying text.
357 This is the purpose of the Qur'Atnic procedure of li'dn, whereby a husband,
who witnesses the adultery of his wife, can simultaneously terminate the marriage and
disavow the paternity of any child resulting from that illicit relationship. Qurdn Al-
Nur 24:6-10.
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terous father gets none of the benefits of the parent-child relation-
ship, it would be unfair to hold him liable for the obligations of the
child. But this is a concept of property law, and is ultimately irrelevant
to the welfare of the child. Indeed, one could argue that if one of the
purposes of the Prophetic ruling was to deter male adulterers by pre-
cluding them from benefiting from their illicit sexual relationship,
this purpose would be further served by imposing upon the adulter-
ous father the same obligations toward the illegitimate child as would
have been the case had the child been the issue of lawful intercourse.
The same approach could be taken with respect to the Qur'dnic
verse, which seems to prohibit adoption. If the example of the
Prophet Muhammad and his adopted son Zayd is taken as paradig-
matic, the Prophet Muhammad adopted Zayd after he had already
become a young man, and despite the fact that Zayd had a known
father. In these circumstances, the best interests of the child are not
being vindicated; instead, the goal is the preservation of an already
existing father-child relationship. Furthermore, the adoption prac-
ticed by the pre-Islamic Arabs and condemned by the Qur'dn, was ef-
fectively a consensual relationship between the adoptive father and
the adopted child that negated an already existing father-child rela-
tionship. To the extent an adult child could adopt a new father, as
Zayd did with Muhammad, a father's ability to rely on his children in
his old age would be lessened, and therefore a father's incentive to
look after his children when they were young would be reduced.
Thus, not only was the pre-Islamic practice not inspired by a concern
for children, it also weakened the bonds between fathers and chil-
dren, and was a custom that was probably detrimental to children.
Accordingly, if a best interest of the child approach is taken to inter-
preting this verse, the prohibition against adoption would be re-
stricted to circumstances where the adopted child is already an adult
with a known father, or more generally, to situations where the
adopted child has a known father, whether legitimate or not.
In light of Islamic law's historical concern for the best interest of
the child, one can argue for a principled inclusion of at least a quasi-
adoptive relationship within Islamic family law. Space does not allow
for the complete elaboration of the details of this relationship, but its
main features are clear-an adoptive father would be obliged to per-
form all the economic obligations that would normally be the duty of
the actual father and would correspondingly receive the parental
rights of the child's theoretical father. Inheritance could be provided
via mandatory testamentary disposition, but fictive kinship need not
be recognized. Such a synthesis would be faithful to the revelatory
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norms of Islam, to the Islamic legal tradition, and to the well being of
children.
CONCLUSION
The United States was founded by settlers of diverse religious
backgrounds. The subsequent influx of peoples of additional religious
affiliations has furthered our well known appellation as a "melting
pot." While the First Amendment has created a wall of separation be-
tween church and state, it would be incorrect to assume that legal
activism and the religious inclinations of the population are absent
from our laws.3 5 8 Despite the desire and denial of many to the con-
trary, a cursory survey of the globe reveals the centrality of religion;
and none of the totalitarian "isms" of the past century have undone
the religious voices. While those who experience the sacred do not
agree on the message, their discourse would not think to entirely neg-
lect a shared belief in concerns of ultimate goodness and truth.
Adoption implicates the reciprocal rights and duties that people
claim for and from each other. But to limit human interactions to
those based solely on duties and rights is to overlook the most essen-
tial aspect of being human-genuine concern for one another. Fo-
cusing on this communal aspect enhances our most human virtues.
Unlike the American legal system, which prides itself on its secular
nature, Jewish law, Canon law, and Islamic law are legal systems which
present themselves as both religion and social order. Just as the terms
'Jewish law," "Canon law," and "Islamic law" have a certain latitude, so
too does the term "best interest of the child." Because of this, courts
unwittingly, or under the pretext of neutrality, gloss over important
contexts of a child's life, including the religious one. How can Ameri-
can adoption law be sufficiently universal359 so as not to invoke the
358 See STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RE-
LIGION IN POLITICS (2000); ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER ET AL., RELIGION AND POLITICS IN
AMERICA: FAITH, CULTURE, & STRATEGIC CHOICES (2d ed. 1999); STEPHEN V. MONSMA &
J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: CHURCH AND STATE IN FIVE DE-
MOCRACIES (1997).
359 A full discussion of universalism versus relativism as applied to adoption law is
beyond the scope of this Article, but it is undoubtedly implicated. See, e.g., Douglas
Lee Donoho, Relativism Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search For Meaningful
Standards, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 345 (1991); Yash Ghai, Universalism and Relativism:
Human Rights as a Frameworkfor Negotiating Interethnic Claims, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 1095,
1101-03 (2000); Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
in National and International Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & ComP. L. 287 (1995); Raidza Torres
Wick, Revisiting the Emerging International Norm on Indigenous Rights: Autonomy as an
Option, 25 YALEJ. INT'L L. 291 (2000).
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Equal Protection Clause, yet still accommodate the religious diversity
of the populace? Were courts more aware of the religious founda-
tions of secular laws, they would be in a better position to render judg-
ments which take into account the full range of a child's multi-faceted
cultural perspective.
The Bible, the source common to Judaism, Islam, and Christian-
ity, strives for a sense of harmony between one individual and an-
other, between the individual and society, and between the individual
and God. All three religions agree that it is this last relationship that
is the foundation of the other two. God has "adopted" Man. It is now
up to each society to determine how individual persons will adopt
each other. To be sure, comparative law is as much a branch of relig-
ious history as it is of legal history, and the religious underpinnings of
the adoption decisionmaking process are very apparent.
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